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New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the 
Chicago School Desegregation Cases 
Neal Devi'ns* 
James B. Stedman** 
Introduction 
The federal government has traditionally had an adversarial re-
lationship with state and local governments in school desegregation 
cases. Frequently, local school systems have either illegally segre-
gated children on the basis of race or failed to use their financial 
resources to correct racial imbalance. Since nondiscrimination was 
central to public policy in the 1960's, federal aid to schools was made 
contingent upon nondiscriminatory practices. Recently, the Reagan 
administration has taken steps to restore what it sees as harmony in 
the area of education between the federal government and state and 
local governments. This article explores the consequences of these 
efforts, focusing specifically on the interaction between the "new fed-
eralism" in education and the school desegregation litigation in 
Chicago. 
In Uni'ted States v. Board of Educati'on ("Chicago") 1 the Reagan De-
partment of Justice ("DOJ") approved a plan designed by the Chi-
cago Board of Education (the "Board") which relied exclusively on 
voluntary desegregation methods, such as magnet schools and major-
ity-to-minority transfers. Prior to Chi'cago, the federal government 
had often sought comprehensive mandatory remedies (such as bus-
ing) in school desegregation lawsuits. The Reagan administration, 
claiming that such mandatory techniques were ineffective, in this 
case expressed both its clear preference for voluntary means of deseg-
• Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. B.A., 
1978, Georgetown University; J.D., 1982, Vanderbilt Law School. Mr. Devins' work on this 
article was undertaken while he was a research associate at Vanderbilt University's Institute 
for Public Policy Studies. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Commission on Civil Rights. 
•• Specialist in education, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. B.A., 
1972, Middlebury College; M.A., 1973, Harvard University. The views expressed are those of 
the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Congressional Research Service. 
The term "new federalism" in education is applied to the Reagan administration's efforts 
to reduce federal involvement in education, as well as to legislative and judicial responses to 
those efforts. 
1 554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
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regation and its willingness to accommodate local preferences. The 
district court agreed. 
The Chicago court upheld the Board's plan as constitutional, 
holding that voluntary techniques can satisfy the Supreme Court's 
requirement that desegregation remedies be effective.2 The court ap-
parently believed that together the city and the federal government 
would provide enough money to upgrade the schools, thus giving 
white students a significant incentive to attend the newly-enhanced 
minority schools. Without this money, the voluntary desegregation 
plan was unlikely to be effective. 
At the same time that the Reagan administration has been will-
ing to approve school desegregation remedies that suit local prefer-
ences, it has had some success in introducing and gaining legislative 
acceptance of a "new federalism" in education, aimed at reducing 
federal involvement. In 1981, categorical aid designed to encourage 
the adoption of federally-approved school desegregation programs 
was eliminated along with other categorical aid programs. 3 These 
programs were replaced by a block grant of federal funds which local 
school systems could spend to suit their own preferences. This block 
grant approach presumes that, overall, federal and state and local 
policy goals are in harmony with each other. As the Reagan admin-
istration contends, "[t]he Federal role is to supply necessary re-
sources, not to specify in excruciating detail what must be done with 
these resources. "4 
Chicago suggests some of the limits of the present education block 
grant for financing school desegregation. First, the block grant ap-
proach does not concentrate federal funding on districts facing the 
high costs of desegregation. Second, since local school districts histor-
ically have not undertaken school desegregation without outside 
pressure, they should not be expected to use these block grant funds 
for such activities. Third, since the block grant does not provide lo-
cal school systems with an incentive to undertake such projects, the 
Reagan administration's pursuit of voluntary desegregation may be 
adversely affected by its "new federalism" in education. In short, if 
the federal government views desegregation as a compelling national 
2 See text accompanying notes 140-85 infta. Unlike Chicago, recent Supreme Court deci-
sions on this issue centered on the scope of mandatory pupil transportation remedies. See, e.g., 
Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. ofEduc. v. Brinkman, 443 
u.s. 536 (1979). 
3 See text accompanying notes 62-76 infta. 
4 WHITE HOUSE, AMERICA'S NEW BEGINNING: A PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC RECOV-
ERY 7-1 (1981). 
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policy objective, it cannot use a block grant funding structure which 
relies on local initiative. 
This article analyzes the Chicago school desegregation litigation 
in the context of past and current federal equal educational opportu-
nity policy. The first section gives an overview of federal policy on 
equal educational opportunity. It highlights the way federal finan-
cial assistance was used from 1965 to 1980 to encourage local school 
desegregation. The second section analyzes the Chicago litigation. It 
discusses the development and court approval of the Board's volun-
tary desegregation plan, and the impact of Chicago on the Reagan 
administration's efforts to have local school systems develop desegre-
gation plans. The third section summarizes the questions that Chi-
cago raises for federal policy. 
I. Federal Assistance for Equal Educational Opportunity 
Over the past two decades, the federal government has pursued 
a goal of equal educational opportunity. Federal funding has been 
used in two ways to advance school desegregation-as leverage to 
secure compliance with civil rights mandates, and as direct support 
of desegregation-related activities. The Reagan administration's 
"new federalism" policy has reconsidered the federal role in educa-
tion, particularly federal efforts to secure equal educational 
opportunity. 
Federal financial assistance to elementary and secondary schools 
was critical to achieving the first substantial breaches in the southern 
system of segregated schools. Between the mid 1960's and 1980, the 
federal government used legislative and judicial sanctions backed by 
substantial amounts of federal aid for education to secure equal edu-
cational opportunity for blacks on a nationwide basis. During the 
1970's, it also gave direct financial assistance to help school districts 
throughout the country implement desegregation plans. The earlier 
federal policy of deference to local interests in education and concern 
that federal education initiatives not diminish local control of educa-
tion were subordinated to the pursuit of the national goal of equal 
educational opportunity. As a result, the federal attitude toward cer-
tain local school systems through much of this period was often one 
of distrust. Federal administrators were unsure of those systems' will-
ingness or ability to address minorities' educational needs. Begin-
ning in 1981, the Reagan administration sought to restore the pre-
1960's harmony between federal and local interests in education. 
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One result was the elimination of any significant federal aid for 
school districts' desegregation efforts. 
A. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act if 1965 
In the decade following the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. 
Board if Education,5 that "in the field of public education the doctrine 
of 'separate but equal' has no place," less actual desegregation of 
southern schools occurred than in 1965. The implementation of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA"),6 cou-
pled with the issuance and enforcement of guidelines for Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,7 marked a significant shift in the rela-
tionship between the federal government and local school systems. 
The primary purpose of federal financial assistance for education was 
no longer to help schools do better what they were already doing; 
rather, it was to remedy their failure to provide equal educational 
opportunity to black children.8 Equal educational opportunity be-
came a powerful, almost irresistible, motive for initiating federal edu-
cation programs from the middle 1960's through the end of the 
1970's. 
Before ESEA's passage, there was little conflict over local school 
officials' desire for autonomy in school administration.9 The major 
pre-ESEA programs provided federal assistance for vocational educa-
tion; 10 for school districts adversely affected by the presence of mili-
tary bases and other federal installations; 11 and for strengthening 
science, mathematics, and modern foreign language instruction.12 
5 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
6 Pub. L . No. 89-10, 92 Stat. 2153 (1965); S. BAILEY & E. MosHER, ESEA: THE 0F.I'ICE 
OF EDUCATION ADMINISTERS A LAW 153 (1968). For the 1965-66 school year, the percentage 
of black children in biracial schools in the 11 southern states rose from 2% to 6%. In 1965, 
more districts started the desegregation process than had done so in the 10 years since 1954. 
For a description of ESEA, see text accompanying notes 19-20 irifi-a. 
7 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (1964). 
8 P. PETERSON, BACKGROUND PAPER, in Making the Grade: Report of the Twentieth 
Century Fund Task Force on Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Policy, 83-105 
(1983); 5 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE FEDERAL 
ROLE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: INTERGOVERNMENTALI:ZING THE CLASSROOM 31-36 
(1981); Hartle & Holland, The Changing Context of Federal Education Aid, 15 EDUC. & URB. 
Soc'y 408-31 (1983). _ 
9 P. PETERSON, supra note 8, at 61. 
10 E.g., Smith-Hughes Act of 1917,39 Stat. 929; Vocational Education Act of 1963, Pub. 
L. No. 88-210, 77 Stat. 403. 
11 "Impact Aid" laws: Pub. L. No. 81-874, 64 Stat. 1100 (1950); Pub. L. No. 81-815, 64 
Stat. 967, 976 (1950). 
12 Title III, National Defense Education Act ["NDEA"] of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 
Stat. 1580, 1588-90. 
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These programs, often initiated by a sense of national emergency, 
maintained the traditional balance between federal and local inter-
ests. The school desegregation issue was set aside in the face of other 
crises. 13 
Congress set the stage for a new kind of federal involvement in 
education when in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 it de-
clared, "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."14 Although 
compliance with this mandate was initially to be sought through vol-
untary means, continued noncompliance could trigger the termina-
tion of federal funds. 15 
Title VI's passage was crucial to the enactment one year later of 
major federal elementary and secondary education programs. Until 
1964, the question of segregated school systems' use of federal money 
had derailed numerous efforts to secure general assistance for elemen-
tary and secondary education. 16 Title VI, originally a bargaining 
chip in the package of civil rights legislation submitted to Congress 
by President Kennedy, 17 removed that question. 18 
Despite a decade-long fight by advocates of general federal aid 
to education, the new programs enacted in 1965 focused on the local 
school systems' failure to provide equal educational opportunities to 
disadvantaged children. In ESEA, Congress declared: 
[It is] to be the policy of the United States to provide financial 
assistance . . . to local educational agencies serving areas with 
13 P. PETERSON, supra note 8, 61-81; G. 0RfiELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN 
EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 4-15,26-27 (1969); ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 8, 1-10. 
14 Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252. 
15 Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 602, 78 Stat. 241, 252. Title 
IV of the Act provided federal assistance for training and advisory services to address racial, 
religious, national origin, and sex desegregation issues in schools. This program continues to 
be funded separately ($24 million for fiscal year 1984), although its activities are among those 
authorized for the new education block grant. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 72 Stat. 346 (1968); s~~ 
note 67 infta. 
16 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 19-
29; S. BAILEY & E. MOSHER, supra note 6, at 21-22; Hartle & Holland, supra note 8, at 417. 
17 G. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 35, 39. 
18 Another potential roadblock to major federal assistance to schools, the long-standing 
question of the participation of parochial schools in federal education aid programs, was fi-
nessed in 1965 by use of the "child-benefit" approach, whereby federally-financed smJices 
were provided to private school students with federal dollars remaining in public hands. Se~ 
P. MERANTO, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION IN 1965: A STUDY IN POLIT-
ICAL INNOVATION 71, 81 (1967). 
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concentrations of children from low-income families to expand 
and improve their educational programs by various means . . . 
which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational 
needs of educationally deprived children. 19 
[1984) 
Although ESEA authorized funding for school libraries, textbooks, 
centers for developing exemplary programs for educational improve-
ment, education research, and grants to strengthen state departments 
of education, the heart of the bill was its billion dollar program of aid 
for the compensatory education of educationally deprived children. 
This program set the terms for the "long awaited breakthrough in 
federal aid to education. " 20 
ESEA changed the tone and nature of federal involvement in 
education. Directed to local school systems' inability or unwilling-
ness to address the needs of disadvantaged children, it clearly sig-
nalled that certain federal educational concerns were not necessarily 
in harmony with, or furthered by, local educational practices. In 
time, federal distrust of some local school systems grew. One mani-
festation was concern over possible local misuse of federal funds. 
"The federal government no longer assumed that local governments 
could operate federal programs without much supervision, became 
suspicious that funds were being diverted from statutory purposes, 
and launched a wide variety of studies and evaluations to ascertain 
program impact."21 
The experience in the mid 1960's of Department of Health, Ed-
ucation and Welfare ("HEW") officials, seeking Title VI compliance 
from school districts receiving significant amounts of new ESEA 
funding, fed the federal government's distrust of local school sys-
tems. 22 Despite widespread initiation of school desegregation activi-
ties, the more actual desegregation required by the federal guidelines, 
the greater the local resistance. 
As HEW read Title VI's legislative history, its requirements 
were consonant with current court rulings.23 As a result, it inter-
preted Title VI's desegregation requirements as being both flexible 
and potentially expansive. Regulations issued by HEW in Decem-
ber, 1964, stated that districts would be considered in compliance 
19 Pub. L. No. 89-10, § 2, 79 Stat. 27, 27 (1965). 
20 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 31. 
21 P. PETERSON, supra note 8, at 83-84. 
22 For a detailed analysis of the implementation of the Title VI guidelines, see G. 
ORFIELD, supra note 13. Many of the points made immediately below are drawn from his 
account. 
23 G. 0RFIELD, supra note 13, at 43, 93. 
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with Title VI if they were subject to a court order or if they submit-
ted a desegregation plan subsequently approved by the Commis-
sioner of Education. 24 As judicial standards developed calling for the 
immediate elimination of dual school systems, 25 and as the passage of 
ESEA in 1965 made Title VI enforcement in southern school districts 
of particular concern to HEW officials, "a device for gradual transi-
tion [was converted] into an engine of revolution."26 
The initial Title VI guidelines, issued in 1965, required the de-
segregation of all grades by 1967.27 They specified that, at a mini-
mum, affected districts would have to desegregate four grades (five in 
some instances) for the 1965-66 academic year. Districts could 
demonstrate their compliance by filing an assurance of compliance 
(not acceptable for districts with continuing dual system practices), 
coming under a court order, or filing an acceptable desegregation 
plan.28 
In 1966 HEW issued revised guidelines for the 1966-67 school 
year. They set performance standards for desegregation in affected 
districts and included faculty integration.29 The revised guidelines 
set more rigorous standards for freedom-of-choice plans, reflecting in-
creasing concern that these plans were intended primarily to main-
tain dual school systems, not dismantle them. 30 
By the third year of Title VI's enforcement, the resistance of 
state and local officials and Congress' restiveness over HEW's height-
ened demands for desegregation were strong enough to freeze the 
guidelines. No changes were made for the 1967-68 school year.31 By 
then the requirements of federal court rulings on school desegrega-
tion began to exceed the HEW requirements.32 
24 21 GONG. Q. ALMANAC 568 (1965). 
25 Su notes 102-06 i'nfta. 
26 G. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 45. 
27 /d. at 98; 21 GONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 24, at 569. 
28 ld. 
29 G. 0RFIELD, supra note 13, at 146; Toward EqtJtJI Educational Opportunz"{J', Smale Select 
Commzitee on Eqt111/ Educational Opportunz"{J', S. REP. No. 92-000, 92nd Con g., 2d Sess. 196 (1972). 
30 G. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 146-47; Toward Equal Educational Opportum"{J', supra note 
29, at 196-197. 
31 G. ORFIELD, supra note 13, at 258. 
32 /d. The Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity in its report 
describes a process in which HEW requirements more closely paralleled court action, indeed 
anticipated the mandates of Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). That deci-
sion held that freedom of choice plans per se did not constitute compliance with Brown. 
Rather, the obligation of school districts was to implement a plan that would in fact desegre-
gate schools "now." ld. at 439. The Select Committee reports that two months prior to that 
decision, HEW had issued new school desegregation guidelines "adopting an identical posi-
tion." S. REP. No. 92-000, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 197 (1972); see notes 102-04 i'!fta. 
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By 1969, with the Nixon administration in office, both the exec-
utive and legislative branches were increasingly found opposing the 
federal courts on school desegregation questions.33 Mounting con-
cern over the extension of desegregation to districts outside the 
South, and heightened opposition to the use of mandatory reassign-
ments ("busing"), led to increased efforts by both branches to curb 
federal action in school desegregation. 34 
Almost as quickly as they had coalesced, the forces that made 
the first substantial inroads into the South's segregated school sys-
tems were challenged and ultimately dissipated. Congressional reac-
tion to HEW's enforcement, cast in part as concern about improper 
extension of federal control over education, succeeded in slowing the 
momentum of the federal enforcement efforts. Although federal 
court decisions continued to challenge local school policies and prac-
tices on questions of race, the "rare historic moment when the Presi-
dent, congressional leadership, and the public all recognized that 
protection of the rights of black Americans was the fundamental (so-
cial and educational] issue" had passed.35 Repeated congressional 
efforts to curb HEW's enforcement of Title VI finally resulted in lan-
guage that significantly limited its authority, particularly with re-
33 G. 0RFIELD, MusT WE Bus?: SEGREGATED ScHOOLS AND NATIONAL Poucy 243 
(1978). 
34 G. 0Rl'IELD, supra note 33, at 235-42. The mandatory reassignment of children was 
opposed by the President who was wedded to the neighborhood schools as the basis for school 
assignments. In his March 24, 1970, statement on school desegregation, President Nixon 
stated: 
I am dedicated to continued progress toward a truly desegregated public school 
system. But, considering the always heavy demands for more school operating 
funds, I believe it is preferable, when we have to make the choice, to use limited 
financial resources for the improvement of education-for better teaching facilities, 
better methods, and advanced educational materials-and for the upgrading of the 
disadvantaged areas in the community rather than buying buses, tires, and gasoline 
to transport young children miles away from their neighborhood schools. 
Statement by the President Setting Forth Administration Policies, 6 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
Doc. 424, 428 (Mar. 30, 1970); su also Federal Poliey Switch Slows School Desegregation, 28 CoNG. 
Q. at 805-11 (Mar. 20, 1970). 
In Congress, there have been repeated efforts to define the scope of the 1964 civil rights 
statutes and the administrative activities taken on their behalf. Efforts made to preclude their 
application to de facto school segregation included the language in section 401 of Title IV of 
the Civil Rights Act defining the term "desegregation" as not including assignment to address 
racial imbalance, and the amendments offered in 1968 by Representative Whitten to the 
HEW FY 1969 appropriations bill to prohibit the use of HEW funds to require school dis-
tricts to assign students to any particular school (amended in the legislative process to limit 
their application to de facto segregation). Pub. L. No. 90-55 7, 82 Stat. 969, 994-95 (1968). Of 
interest, the Whitten amendments have been added to every HEW or Department of Educa-
tion appropriations act since then. 
35 G. 0RFIELD, supra note 13, at 39. 
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gard to mandatory reassignments.36 Nevertheless, by the end of the 
1960's, the efforts of the federal government had dramatically eroded 
southern school segregation. For example, between 1963 and 1968, 
the percentage of black children in all-black schools in the South 
dropped from ninety-eight percent to twenty-five percent.37 
B. The Emergency School Assistance Program of 1970 
The federal courts heightened their demands for desegregation 
in the late 1960's.38 Southern school officials were faced with the task 
of immediately eliminating their dual systems. President Nixon 
called for federal funds to assist "school districts in meeting special 
problems incident to court-ordered desegregation."39 He requested 
$500 million in fiscal year ("FY") 1971 funds and $1 billion in FY 
1972 funds for the effort.40 He justified this substantial financial in-
vestment in school desegregation as follows: 
Communities desegregating their schools face special needs-for 
classrooms, facilities, teachers, teacher training-and the Nation 
should help meet those needs. 
The Nation also has a vital and special stake in upgrading 
education where de focto segregation persists-and where extra ef-
forts are needed if the schools are to do their job. These schools, 
too, need extra money for teachers and facilities.41 
Devised as part of Nixon's "southern strategy" to foster Republican 
party support in the South,42 the funding proposal gained backing 
from school officials and desegregation advocates.43 The Emergency 
36 The so-called Eagleton-Eiden amendment, attached to every piece of HEW or Depart-
ment of Education appropriations legislation since 1977, reads as follows: 
None of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to require, directly or 
indirectly, the transportation of any student to a school other than the school which 
is nearest the student's home, except for a student requiring special education, in 
order to comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For the purpose of 
this section an indirect requirement of transportation of student includes the trans-
portation of students to carry out a plan involving the reorganization of the grade 
structure of schools, the pairing of schools, or the clustering of schools, or any combi-
nation of grade restructuring, pairing, or clustering. The prohibition described in 
this section does not include the establishment of magnet schools. 
Pub. L. 98-139, § 306, 97 Stat. 871, 895 (1983). 
37 G. 0RI'IELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-80, at 5 
(1983). 
38 Se~ notes 102-07 i'nfta. 
39 Statement by the President, supra note 34, at 436. 
40 ld. 
41 /d. 
42 P. PJ:."TERSON, supra note 8, at 126-27. 
43 G. 0RI'IELD, supra note 33, at 245. 
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School Assistance Program ("ESAP") was initiated with funds ap-
propriated under discretionary authority of the Commissioner of Ed-
ucation in 1970, and $171 million was provided for it over the course 
of its slightly more than two year existence.44 
C. The Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 
ESAP was hastily assembled and several evaluations concluded 
that it was poorly administered.45 The General Accounting Office 
studied the program and concluded that its funds had frequently 
been awarded to segregated districts and often were not used to fur-
ther desegregation.46 After protracted congressional debate, ESAP's 
successor, the Emergency School Aid Act ("ESAA"), was enacted as 
part of the Education Amendments of 1972.47 Designed to avoid 
many of its predecessor's failings, including the funding of segregated 
districts, ESAA imposed strict non-discrimination standards for 
school districts' eligibility. Compliance was to be determined by a 
"pre-grant" review of the applicant school districts.48 To be eligible, 
districts had to be implementing a plan requiring desegregation of 
children or faculty pursuant to either a final court order or an order 
of a state agency or official, a desegregation plan approved under 
Title VI, or a voluntary plan for the elimination of minority group 
isolation. 
Between FY 1973 and FY 1981, $2.2 billion was provided to 
desegregating school districts under ESAA for staff training, addi-
tional staff, new curriculum development, community relations ac-
tivities, and in its final years, the financing of magnet schools.4 9 
Amended several times over the course of the decade, ESAA in its 
last two years focused increasingly on activities directly related to the 
implementation of desegregation plans and on those districts most 
recently adopting desegregation plans, rather than on compensatory 
education (an approved use of funds before passage of the Education 
44 The Emergency School Aid Act, 9 AM. EDUC. 9 (1973). 
45 G. 0RFIELD, supra note 33, at 246-4 7. 
46 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NEED TO IMPROVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR 
APPROVING GRANTS UNDER THE EMERGENCY SCHOOL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Mar. 5, 
1971); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WEAKNESSES IN SCHOOL DISTRICTS' IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF EMERGENCY SCHOOL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Sept. 29, 1971). 
47 Title VII, Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235. 
48 J Stedman, The Possible Impact o/the Education Consolidation and Improvement Acto/ 1981 on 
Activiti'es That Have Been Funded Under the Emergency School Aid Act, Congressional Research Serv-
ice Oan. 11, 1982), reprinted in School Desegregation: Heanngs Bifore the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constziuti'onal Rights o/ the House Comm. on the JudiCiary, 97th Con g ., 1st Sess. 733-54 (1982). 
49 !d. 
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Amendments of 1978).50 Over time, the "emergency" that the pro-
gram addressed evolved from meeting immediate desegregation re-
quirements to resolving the enduring problems associated with school 
desegregation.51 It must be noted that ESAA funds were not to be 
used for student transportation (a restriction particularly opposed by 
local school officials) and were not to supplant state or local funds.52 
Until passage of the Education Amendments of 1978, the latter re-
quirement proscribed the use of ESAA funds for court-ordered activi-
ties under eligible desegregation plans. 53 
D. ESAA 'S Pre-Grant Review 
HEW's pre-grant review process merits additional scrutiny. For 
most of the program's anti-discrimination provisions, disproportion-
ate impact of a school district's policies or practices on minority chil-
dren or faculty was sufficient for a finding of ineligibility.54 But 
school districts ,found in violation of those provisions could secure 
waivers of ineligibility if they agreed to take specific, remedial deseg-
regation actions. 55- HEW had to initiate court-ordered Title VI com-
pliance proceedings against any district that failed to secure a waiver 
of its ineligible status under the ESAA pre-grant review process. 56 
One measure of the effectiveness of the pre-grant review is the 
extent to which ineligible districts secured waivers. Between FY 1975 
and FY 1981, of the 731 districts declared ineligible (excluding those 
incorrectly identified by HEW to be in violation), 502 or sixty-nine 
percent secured waivers.57 During a particular two-year period, the 
50 Title VI, Education Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561, § 601, 92 Stat. 2143, 
2250-68. 
51 L. FERRARA, E. REISNER, B. GUTMANN, & M. BRAUEN, EMERGENCY SCHOOL AID 
Ac:r (ESAA): A FEDERAL PROGRAM TO MEET DESEGREGATION RELATED NEEDS, DECI-
SION RESOURCES 3, 7-8 (Aug. 1982)(draft prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Educ.). 
52 G. 0RFIELD, supra note 33, at 246; L. FERRARA, supra note 51, at 13. 
53 L. FERRARA, supra note 51, at 13. 
54 Se-e Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979). 
55 A local educational agency was ineligible if, after June 23, 1972, it had: (1) transferred 
property or given services to a private school or system without first determining that it was 
not racially segregated and did not discriminate; (2) discriminated in the hiring, promoting, 
or assigning of employees; (3) assigned children to or within classes so that minority group 
students were separated from others for a substantial part of the day; or (4) discriminated in 
any other way, such as limiting the activities in which minority group children might partici-
pate. 20 U.S.C .. § 3196 (prior to repeal). 
56 Adams v. Califano, 430 F. Supp. 118 (D.D.C. 1977). Califano validated the effort of 
civil rights plaintiffs to force HEW to comply with its earlier specified effects-oriented require-
ments. Califano arose in the context of public higher education desegregation plans, but its 
principle extends broadly to Title VI compliance procedures. 
57 J. Stedman, supra note 48, at 747. A significant ponion of those failing to secure waiv-
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pre-grant review process resulted in the reassignment of approxi-
mately 244,000 school children from racially isolated classes.58 A for-
mer director of the Office for Civil Rights, the entity within HEW 
responsible for the pre-grant reviews, testified before a congressional 
subcommittee: "It is our judgment that the pre-grant conditions of 
the kind contained in the ESAA statute are among the most effective 
ways of enforcing non-discrimination provisions of law and ensuring 
equal opportunities for the beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries of 
federal financial assistance. " 59 
E. The uNew Federalism"'"' in Education-Chapter 2 of The Education 
Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 
During the Carter administration, ESAA was modified by the 
Education Amendments of 1978 in response to criticism that it was 
unduly funding old desegregation plans and that its funds were used 
excessively for compensatory education, an activity already being 
funded by Title I of ESEA.60 Yet it remained a significant source of 
federal assistance for school desegregation, with annual appropria-
tions in some years exceeding $300 million.61 
With the advent of the Reagan administration, ESAA ran afoul 
of the "new federalism" in education. On February 18, 1981, the 
White House issued "America's New Beginning: A Program for Eco-
nomic Recovery,"62 a lengthy list of proposed changes to federal pro-
grams to reduce federal expenditures and the federal presence in 
many areas of domestic life. For elementary and secondary educa-
tion, it called for consolidating forty-five federal programs in order to 
"shift control over education policy away from the Federal Govern-
ment and back to State and local authorities-where it constitution-
ally and historically belongs. " 63 In support of its block grant 
program, the administration argued: 
ers were ineligible because their desegregation plans were ineligible, not because of civil rights 
violations. 
58 /d. at 748. 
59 J. Stedman, supra note 48, at 749 (statement of David S. Tatel). For another positive 
assessment of the pre-grant review process, see P. HILL & E. MARKS, FEDERAL INFLUENCE 
OVER STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: THE CASE OF NONDISCRIMINATION IN EDUCA-
TION (Dec. 1982)(prepared by the Rand Corp. for the Nat'l Institute of Educ.). It must be 
stressed that evaluations of the programs supported by ESAA funding are mixed. J. 
Stedman, supra note 48, at 744-45. 
60 See notes 50 and 53 supra. 
61 J. Stedman, supra note 48, at 736. 
62 WHITE HOUSE, supra note 4. 
63 /d. at 7-1. 
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Existing multiple program requirements are burdensome, inflexi-
ble, unresponsive, and duplicative, resulting in waste of resources 
at all levels of government; the block grant approach will elimi-
nate such unneeded Federal rules. The Federal role is to supply 
necessary resources, not to specify in excruciating detail what 
must be done with these resources. 64 
1255 
Among the Reagan administration's first actions in the area of 
school desegregation was to request a cut of $59.3 million in FY 1981 
ESAA funds.65 The Senate, newly under Republican control, sought 
to cut ESAA funding by $117.8 million, or fifty percent. This effort 
was compromised in a conference committee with the House on the 
Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act, 1981. ESAA's FY 
1981 funding was reduced by $87.1 million, from $236.3 million to 
$149.2 million.66 Then in midyear, the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 198167 (the legislative response to the administration's call 
for the "new federalism" in education), repealed over two dozen sep-
arate categorical education programs and authorized their various 
activities in a new education block grant, Chapter 2 of the Education 
Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 ("Chapter 2").68 
Among the programs repealed and consolidated was ESAA, the only 
repealed program targeted at minority school children.69 
Although ESAA's inclusion in the education block grant 
aroused little public debate, it became clear at the end of 1981 and 
the beginning of 1982 that school districts with significant ESAA 
funding were likely to experience dramatic reductions under Chapter 
2. The Chapter 2 allocation process spreads funds across potentially 
64 /d. The criticism leveled at federal education programs by the Reagan administration 
is supported by many who feel that federal dollars, constituting only 8.6% of all public school 
expenditures in 1981-82, have been used excessively to direct and control local education. 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1982, 
at 21, table 14 (1982). 
65 46 Fed. Reg. 18,210 (1981). 
66 127 GONG. REC. H2645 (daily ed. June 4, 1981). The legislation was signed into law 
as Pub. L. No. 97-12, 95 Stat. 14 (1981). 
67 Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981). 
68 Title V, SubtitleD, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 
95 Stat. 469-80 (1981). 
69 L. DARLING-HAMMOND & E. MARKS, THE NEW FEDERALISM IN EDUCATION: STATE 
RESPONSES TO THE 1981 EDUCATION CONSOLIDATION AND IMPROVEMENT ACT 18 
(1983)(prepared by the Rand Corp. for the U.S. Dep't of Educ.). Three categories of activi-
ties are authorized by Chapter 2: basic skills development, education improvement and sup-
port services, and special projects. The second of these categories authorizes the activities 
formerly funded by ESAA. These are described as programs to address educational problems 
stemming from the isolation of minority group students, to develop and implement desegre-
gation plans, and to meet the needs of children in schools undergoing desegregation. 
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all 16,000 local school districts to be used for act1v1t1es previously 
authorized by many separate categorical programs. 70 In addition, in 
its first two years of operation, fewer dollars were available for Chap-
ter 2 activities than had been appropriated in FY 1981 for the ante-
cedent programs. 71 The House Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights reported in March, 1982, that as a result of 
these funding reductions, desegregation activities "will diminish if 
not disappear in many communities. For example, the funding for 
fiscal year 1982 for the entire State of Delaware [under Chapter 2] is 
50 percent less than the 1981 ESAA funding just for the New Castle 
County school district."72 Among the Nation's largest school dis-
tricts, those with FY 1981 ESAA grants of over $1 million lost be-
tween six and seventy-nine percent of their antecedent federal 
funding in FY 1981 under the block grant. 73 
Local school districts, given the freedom under Chapter 2 to 
choose among a relatively broad array of activities, appear unlikely 
to direct their funding to desegregation. The most popular expendi-
ture has been on instructional equipment (reported by over eighty-
eight percent of the districts responding to one survey). 74 One expla-
nation of the interest in equipment, particularly computer hardware, 
is that many districts received relatively small grants, insufficient for 
initiating any broad-based programs. 75 Spending on ESAA-like ac-
70 Chapter 2 allocates its funding among the states according to each state's share of the 
national population aged 5 to 17. At least 80% of the state's allocation must be distributed to 
local educational agencies using a state-derived formula. That formula must be based on 
public and private school enrollments, adjusted to reflect "high cost" students (those from 
low-income families, those in economically-depressed area, or those living in sparsely popu-
lated areas). Local school authorities have complete discretion to choose among the various 
activities authorized by Chapter 2. Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 563, 565-66, 95 Stat. 35 7, 469-71 
(1981) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3813, 3815-16 (1982)). 
71 According to "The Fiscal Year 1983 Budget," released by the Department of Educa-
tion on Feb. 8, 1982, the FY 1981 appropriation for the antecedent programs to Chapter 2 
was $537.485 million. The Departments' "The Fiscal Year 1984 Budget," released Jan. 31, 
1983, lists the FY 1982 appropriation for Chapter 2 at $470.4 million. "The Fiscal Year 1985 
Budget," released Feb. 1, 1984, reports that the FY 1983 appropriation for Chapter 2 was 
$4 79.42 million. (fhese Budgets on file with authors.) 
72 School Desegregation, H.R. REP. No. 12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982). 
73 R. juNe & T. BARTELL, FisCAL EI-"FECTs m· THE CHAPTER 2, ECIA BLOCK GRANT 
ON THE LARGEST DISTRICTS AND CITIES 11, 13 tables 3 & 4 (May 1983)(prepared by Ad-
vanced Technology, Inc., for the U .S. Dep't of Educ.). Of the 13 districts in this sample that 
had FY 1981 ESAA awards in excess of $1 million, the entire Chapter 2 allocation for FY 1982 
for 8 of them was less than their FY 1981 ESAA funding. ld. 
74 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, THE IMPACT OF CHAPTER 2 
OF THE EDUCATION CONSOLIDATION AND IMPROVEMENT ACT ON LocAL EDUCATION 
AGENCIES 13, table 6 (1983). 
75 ld. at 18. 
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tivities has been much less popular (reported by only six percent of 
the responding districts).76 
F. Conclusions 
Several points are made clear by reviewing the experience of 
federal financial support of school desegregation over the past two 
decades. The federal government has at its disposal a number of 
tools for addressing equal educational opportunity in local school sys-
tems. In the mid 1960's, the prospect of substantial levels of ESAA 
funding gave HEW's efforts to enforce Title VI an impact they 
would otherwise not have had. But resistance grew as HEW in-
creased its demands for school desegregation as the price for federal 
aid. Ultimately, HEW's enforcement was blunted, but the federal 
courts handed down major decisions in the late 1960's and early 
1970's that maintained the pressure for school desegregation. One 
federal response to that pressure was to provide over $2 billion 
through ESAA in support of desegregation-related activities in the 
1970's. 
In the 1980's, with the first major legislative step toward the 
"new federalism" in education, financial support targeted at desegre-
gation was largely eliminated, and with it a means of pursuing equal 
educational opportunity. The history of the period reveals that with-
out outside pressure, most school districts are not likely to pursue 
that goal. Thus the present education block grant appears to exert 
little or no leverage on school districts' desegregation practices. In-
deed, some have argued that the "new federalism" in education di-
rectly opposes certain other federal goals, including the achievement 
of equal educational opportunity. 77 
76 Id at 13, table 6. In addition, 5% of the responding districts spent their FY 1982 
Chapter 2 dollars on "desegregation training and advisory services" (the activities authorized 
by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). See also Block Grants Have Weakened Federal Pro-
grams for the Educati'onai!J .Disadvantaged, Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Rdatz'ons and Human Re-
sources of the Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1983). 
77 [W)hat is called the New Federalism is really equivalent to the pre-1960s old fed-
eralism, in which SLEAs [state and local educational agencies] simply made deci-
sions that satisfied their own priorities without considering those of the nation. That 
was the driving force for the federal fiscal interventions in the first place. Unfortu-
nately, the dilemma of harmonizing educational policies at a state and local level 
with the needs of the nation has not disappeared, and the New Federalism does not 
represent a real alternative to federal fiscal policy in this area. 
Levin, Federal Grants and Educational Equz'?J, 52 HARV. Eouc. REV. 456 (1982); see also L. DAR-
LING-HAMMOND & E. MARKS, supra note 69, at 82. 
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II. The Desegregation Litigation in Chicago 
In his January 1983 decision, United States v. Board of Educati'on,78 
Judge Milton Shadur upheld as constitutional a desegregation plan 
prepared by the Chicago Board of Education. The issue presented in 
the case was significant since the plan, the result of a consent decree 
betweeen the United States and the Board, 79 was designed to deseg-
regate Chicago schools without mandatory pupil reassignments.80 
The Chicago case is also significant as a manifestation of the 
"new federalism": the Board was able to craft a desegregation plan 
according to its own policy preferences. Previously, the federal gov-
ernment approached the remedial issue in school desegregation law-
suits in an adversarial manner-generally seeking comprehensive 
remedies which included mandatory pupil reassignments. In Chicago, 
the Reagan administration demonstrated that it would not ask for 
busing.81 
A. Background o/Chicago 
Under the Carter administration, federal efforts to require the 
Board to desegregate its school system formally began on April 9, 
1979,82 when HEW notified the Board that it was ineligible to re-
ceive ESAA funds because its practices constituted racial discrimina-
78 554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
79 Order, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 1980). 
80 See Glenn, Cautious Pragmatism in Chicago Plan, Eouc. WEEK, Mar. 9, 1983, at 24; see also 
notes 135-40 infta. 
81 It is important to recognize that Congress has authorized the Department of Justice to 
file desegregation lawsuits. See Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Department has acted on this 
authority in almost every school desegregation lawsuit brought before the Supreme Court. 
See amicus brief in Nashville. For a discussion of Reagan administration policies on this issue, 
see notes 135-39 ziifi-a. Prior to the Reagan administration's antibusing policies, the Depart-
ment had almost always sought to expand both the bounds of the definition of illegal discrim-
ination and the parameters of desegregation remedies. The Reagan administration, however, 
views the busing remedy as devisive and ineffective. See note 136 i'nfta. 
82 The federal concern with school desegregation in Chicago has a long history. In light 
of the discussion in Section I, perhaps the most significant aspect of that federal concern was 
the aborted effort in 1965 by HEW to cut off the flow of ESEA funds to the Chicago school 
system. See G. 0RFIELD, supra note 13, at 152-207; S. BAILEY & E. MOSHER, supra note 6, at 
151-53. Fear that the Chicago school superintendent might misuse the newly available ESEA 
funds to maintain segregated schools prompted Commissioner of Education Keppel to defer 
action on grants to the district. HEW had already initiated an investigation of the Chicago 
schools in response to complaints of Title VI violations. Critics of the action quickly charac-
terized it as a federal effort to control education. Mayor Daley of Chicago spoke personally to 
President Johnson about the issue at a meeting in New York. Shortly thereafter, HEW 
agreed to release Chicago's funds in exchange for a commitment from the school board to 
reaffirm earlier resolutions on school desegregation in the city and to investigate school at-
tendance boundaries. 
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tion in violation of Title VI. On September 17, 1979, HEW 
informed the Board that it would refer the matter to the DOJ in one 
month if the Board had not by then rebutted or explained HEW's 
finding of illegal segregation. 83 HEW also demanded that the Board 
develop a plan to remedy its segregation.84 On October 29, 1979, 
HEW referred this matter to the DOJ.85 Despite its failure to secure 
ESAA funding for the 1979-80 school year, the Board applied for the 
same funding the next school year. 86 HEW again refused the 
request.87 
Formal DOJ involvement: began on April 21, 1980, when it noti-
fied the Board of its intention to file a desegregation lawsuit.88 Fol-
lowing this announcement, the Board and DOJ sought through 
negotiations to develop a traditional, mandatory student assignment 
plan.89 The first negotiations failed since the parties could not agree 
on either specific racial percentages for the reassignments or on the 
amount of federal funds the Board would receive to implement such 
a plan. go After this round, a new Board took office and succeeded in 
negotiating a consent decree. 
At this stage, what was to become the Chicago lawsuit evi-
denced the type of give-and-take between the federal government 
and local school systems typical of other desegregation cases. The 
Board wanted federal dollars. The DO] wanted to advance national 
desegregation objectives. At the same time, the federal government 
may have had the ulterior motive of seeking political support for 
President Carter's 1980 reelection campaign.91 
83 Complaint at 3, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 
1980). 
84 /d. 
85 /d. at 4. On Oct. 17, 1979, the Board specifically denied that it had committed illegal 
discriminatory practices. /d. at 3. On Oct. 18, 1979, HEW demanded that the Board "sub-
mit ... an acceptable desegregation plan within ten days." /d. at 4. The Board failed to 
submit a plan to HEW. 
86 See i'd. 
87 See z'd. at 4. The Department of Education affirmed HEW's decision on June 12, 1980. 
/d. 
88 See Brief for the Board of Educ. of Chicago at 6, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 
83-2308, No. 83-2402, No. 83-2445 (7th Cir. 1983). 
89 See id. 
90 See i'd. 
91 This suggestion is supported by a shift in Carter administration remedial objectives in 
the Chicago case. Zielenziger, Chicago on Collision Course with U.S. on JJesegregation, Washington 
Post, Oct. 13, 1979, at A3, col. 1. HEW's Office for Civil Rights reportedly wanted the Chi-
cago school board to agree that mandatory busing would be used if voluntary methods failed 
to achieve a pattern of pupil distribution in which no public school could be greater than 50% 
white or 65% black. HEW reportedly rejected Superintendent Joseph P. Hannon's "Access to 
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On September 14, 1980, the Board and DOJ jointly petitioned 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
to enter the consent decree,92 and the DOJ filed a complaint charg-
ing the Board with illegal, racially-discriminatory conduct.93 Judge 
Shadur approved the decree the same day.94 
1. The Consent Decree 
Rather than specifying the details of a desegregation plan, the 
consent decree outlined general principles that the Board would use 
in its attempt "to remedy the present effects of past segregation of 
Black and Hispanic students."95 For example, instead of defining a 
desegregated school or what percentage of the system's schools should 
be desegregated, the decree provided only for "the establishment of 
the greatest practicable number of stably desegregated schools, con-
sidering all the circumstances in Chicago."96 
Yet despite its general language, the consent decree recognized 
that the Board had the responsibility of developing a plan falling 
within the "broad range of constitutionally acceptable plans. "97 Ad-
ditionally, the Board and DOJ agreed that "specific racial ratios in 
schools [are not] a necessary remedy in desegregation cases, that ra-
cial and ethnic balance throughout the Chicago School District is 
neither practicable nor required, and that no particular definition of 
a desegregated school is required. " 98 As a correlative, the decree 
specified that mandatory pupil reassignment and transportation 
Excellence" plan because, among other things, it was too vague and relied principally on 
voluntary measures. 
92 Joint Motion of the United States and the Board of Education for Entry of Consent 
Decree, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 1980). 
93 Complaint, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 1980). 
It is common practice for the simultaneous filing of a consent decree and a complaint in a 
school desegregation lawsuit. See, ~.g., Mirga & Caldwell, U.S. Approv~s Voluntary Plans to D~seg­
ugat~Eouc. WEEK, Feb. 1, 1983,at 1. 
94 Consent Decree, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 
1980). 
95 Consent Decree at 4, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
24, 1980). The Board, however, did not admit to illegally segregating Chicago's schools. ld. 
at 2. 
96 ld. at 4. In a similar vein, the decree provided that "[t]o the greatest extent practica-
ble, the plan will provide for desegregation of all racial and ethnic groups," and that "[t]he 
plan shall ensure that the burdens of desegregation are not imposed arbitrarily on any racial 
or ethnic group." /d. at 4-5. 
97 ld. at 5. The DOJ reasoned that "the Board's familiarity with and sensitivity to the 
unique situation presented in Chicago ... [will enable it] to select from within the constitu-
tional range the plan that best meets the needs of the Chicago School District." ld. 
98 /d. at 5. 
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remedies would be used only "to the extent that other techniques are 
insufficient. " 99 
Voluntary desegregation offers participating students the signifi-
cant benefits of choice. Yet for such a plan to be effective, students 
must have sufficient knowledge and incentive to choose to transfer 
among schools. Additional money may be needed to inform the 
community of various educational opportunities and to make alter-
native schooling options truly worthwhile. In Chicago, for example, 
the school board budgeted approximately $300 million to implement 
the desegregation plan for two years. 100 
Local school systems may prefer voluntary techniques in order 
to retain their traditional responsibiity for education policy decisions. 
This preference is consistent with the "new federalism" in educa-
tion.101 To pass constitutional muster, however, voluntary plans 
must effectively desegregate area schools. 
Brown's promise of equal educational opportunity was severely 
limited by recalcitrant school systems, which implemented voluntary 
freedom-of-choice plans. Typically, no white children and very few 
black children chose to cross the old racial lines. In 1968, the 
Supreme Court invalidated such plans in Green v. Country School 
Board.102 It ruled that previously segregated school systems had an 
"affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to con-
vert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be 
eliminated root and branch."103 The Court demanded that school 
boards come forward with a plan "that promises realistically to work 
now."104 Green did not require mandatory pupil assignments. Yet, 
the Court clearly suggested that choice, by itself, would not satisfy 
desegregation obligations. 
Mandatory busing remedies were first approved by the Supreme 
Court in 1971. In Swann v. Charlotte-Meclclenburg Coun!J Board of Educa-
tion, 105 the Court required lower courts to look at the actual effects of 
a desegregation plan. Swann recognized the use of white-black pupil 
99 Id. at 6. 
100 As noted in the district court's June 30 ruling, "[f]or school year 1983-84 [the] Board 
has budgeted $66.9 million for the implementation of the Plan [and the] Board presently 
projects a budget deficit of approximately $200 million for its 1983-84 fiscal year." 567 F. 
Supp. at 274: The DOJ disputed these figures. 
101 &e notes 63-64 supra. 
102 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
103 Id. at 437-48. 
104 Id. at 439. 
105 402 u.s. 1 (1971). 
' 
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ratios as "a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy," 106 and 
that compulsory busing was an appropriate starting point remedy. 
The Court acknowledged that in order to eliminate all vestiges of an 
unconstitutional dual school system, desegregation remedies may be 
"administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre."107 
Swann, however, does not forbid the use of voluntary techniques. In-
stead, Swann's sole demand is that school boards dftctive{y desegregate 
area schools. 
Recent court-ordered desegregation remedies still emphasize 
mandatory pupil reassignments, however.108 Chicago thus appears 
to be the administration's test case109 to see whether the DOJ can 
successfully implement its anti-busing policies. 110 
The consent decree's emphasis on expansive Board authority 
and its preference for desegregation techniques not involving trans-
portation represents a drastic shift from prior DOJ tactics. The 
Carter administration's preference for both an expansive definition 
of illegal segregation and area-wide mandatory transportation reme-
dies may be seen in its handling of other cases. 111 In Columbus Board oJ 
106 /d. at 25. 
107 /d. at 28. 
108 In the Nashville desegregation, for example, the court of appeals held that modifica-
tions in desegregation remedies must comport with current black/white student population 
ratios, despite the district court's finding that such an approach cannot effectively desegregate 
the schools and is educationally unsound. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 492 
F. Supp. 167 (N.D. Tenn. 1980), reu'd, 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982), art. denied, 104 S. Ct. 834 
{1983). For a critique of the appellate ruling, see Devins, New Dilemmas and Opportumiies in 
Integrating Schools, Eouc. WEEK, Mar. 9, 1984, at 24. For a related case, see Tasby v. Estes, 
412 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd, 572 F.2d 1010 {5th Cir. 1978), art. denied, 444 U.S. 
437 (1980). 
109 The significance of Chicago is seen in this colloquy between Assistant Attorney General 
Reynolds and then-Congressman Harold Washington at Congressional hearings on 
desegregation: 
Mr. Washington. You seem to have great confidence in a voluntary student transfer 
program. Are you using Chicago as an example of a voluntary program that could 
work? 
Mr. Reynolds. I think Chicago is a volunteer program that will work. . . . I think 
that overall that the plan that is being followed in Chicago is one that people are 
very optimistic and positive about, and I think it is working. 
School Desegregation: Heanizgs Bifore the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of House Comm. 
on thcJudici'ary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 733-54 (1982). 
110 See, e.g., Kirp, Buszizg Polzii'cs andJudges, Chicago Trib., Oct. 17, 1982, § 2 at 7. 
111 The Carter administration also sought the adoption of an expansive definition of ra-
cial discrimination in the areas of tax-exemption for private schools. In August 1978, the 
Carter IRS sought to deny tax-exemption for private schools whose percentage of minority 
students was less than 20% of the minority population in the area served by the school. 43 
Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978). Congress stayed the implementation of these guidelines by passing 
riders to the Treasury Appropriations Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 615,94 Stat. 559,577 
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Education v. Peniclc112 and Dayton Board of Education v. Bnizlcman, 113 for 
example, the Supreme Court accepted the Carter DOJ's argument 
that "a pre-1954 substantive violation [of Brown], unremedied by af-
firmative action of the Creen/Swann standard [e.g., comprehensive 
mandatory pupil reassignment] is the cause of current observed seg-
regation .... " That is, a "racially desegregated society exists ab-
sent discriminatory governmental action."114 The departure in 
Chicago from previous Carter administration policies led to accusa-
tions that the Board-DOJ consent decree was a political sell-out 
designed to assist the 1980 Carter reelection campaign. 115 Ironically, 
judicial adoption of these Carter administration views suggested that 
the Board's voluntary desegregation plan might raise significant con-
stitutional issues.tt6 
2. Attempts to Intervene 
The consent decree caused a public outcry among national civil 
rights groups. Within a week after its entry, the metropolitan Chi-
cago NAACP filed a motion to intervene as a party plaintiff. 117 It 
called the "[g]overnment's approval . . . a clear, blatant and uncon-
scionable failure to fulfill its duty in this litigation to represent the 
rights and interests of black students of the Chicago Public 
(1979). For a general discussion of Carter administration efforts to advance the concerns of 
civil rights groups in the tax-exemption controversy, see McCoy and Devins, Standing and 
Advn-sen~ss on th~ /ssu~ of Tax-Exanpti'ons for Raci'al{y .Discriminatory Pnvat~ Schools, 52 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 441 (1984). 
112 443 u.s. 449 (1979). 
113 443 u.s. 526 (1979). 
114 ). BLUMSTEIN, LEGAL ISSUES IN THE DESEGREGATION OF POST-SECONDARY EDUCA-
TION 16-17 (1981)(V.I.P.P.S. Working Paper). University of Chicago Law Professor Edmund 
W. Kitch thought that these decisions spoke to an even broader proposition: 
[In Columbus and .Do/ton] the Court endorses an approach to the 'factual' question 
that makes proof of a neighborhood school into proof of racial discrimination. It 
then approves a remedy which, by implication, assumes that a neighborhood school 
policy, when combined with any significant residential segregation, is 
unconstitutional. 
Kitch, Th~ Return ofColor-Consci'ousn~ss to th~ Constziution: Webaj .Do/ton~ and Columbus, 1979 SuP. 
CT. REV. 1, 6 {1980). 
115 Denton, U.S.~ Chicago R~ach Pact on .D~s~gr~gati'on, Washington Post, Sept. 25, 1980, AI, 
at col. 6. Thomas I. Atkins, general counsel for the NAACP, referred to the consent decree as 
follows: "An elephant labored and produced a mouse . . . . In the absence of substantive 
content, . . . the timing becomes suspect." &~ also Uniqu~ Chicago-Justic~ .D~s~gr~gation Pact 
Approvd, Educ. Daily, Sept. 26, 1980, at 1-2. 
116 Su~ ~.g., Kirp, supra note 110, at 7 ("The federal courts will likely disapprove of [the 
Board plan] ... to do otherwise would seem to signal abandonment to the judicial commit-
ment to undo the effects of Jim Crow."). 
117 Su United States v. Board of Educ., 88 F.R.D. 679, 680 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
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Schools,"118 and suggested that the Board's plan offered no promise 
of effectively desegregating Chicago's schools, 119 since it considered 
white-Hispanic schools to be integrated. 
Similar motions to intervene were filed in mid-November by the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund. 120 The Chicago 
Urban League,121 like the NAACP, attacked the Board's inclusive 
definition of minority students, a definition which grouped black and 
Hispanic students into a single minority classification. The NAACP 
and Urban League argued that such a grouping would result in the 
plan's failure to address the specific needs of black schoolchildren.122 
The Board and DOJ opposed the motions. 123 On January 6, 1981, 
Judge Shadur denied them. 124 The court reasoned: 
Intervention at this stage of the proceedings would deflect 
the litigation from its essential goal of producing at the earliest 
feasible date a desegregated school system for the Chicago public 
schools, and more importantly, for the very classes whose rights 
the intervenors seek to protect. 125 
The court n·oted that intervenors might attempt to open up the issue 
of the Board's liability-an issue whose resolution would take at least 
one year. 126 The court accepted as true the DOJ contention that "in 
public law litigation, where compliance depends in part on public 
acceptance and the least possible acrimony between the parties, set-
tlement is particularly welcome for it signifies cooperation between 
the parties." 127 Finally, the court noted that in cases like this, there 
was a presumption that the DOJ would adequately represent the 
118 NAACP Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene at 1, United States v. 
Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1982). 
119 See Reply Memoranda of Board of Education in Support of Desegregation Plan at 7, 
United States v. Board ofEduc., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1982). 
120 See id. Interestingly, the groups who opposed the Board's plan were either national 
organizations or local chapters of national organizations. These groups were seeking to im-
pose upon the Board the pre-Reagan federal view of school desegregation. 
121 See Chicago Urban League, An Assessment of the Chicago Board of Education's De-
segregation Plan (Feb. 16, 1982) (hereinafter cited as Chicago Urban League]. 
122 The Urban League contended that "traditional minority group status should not be a 
sufficient criterion for inclusion with blacks as groups requiring a remedy from past racial 
isolation. . . . Rather than white vs. nonwhite, the basic dichotomy in terms of racial segre-
gation in schools has been black vs. nonblack." /d. at 1-2. 
123 United States v. Board of Educ, 88 F.R.D. 679, 681 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
124 /d. 
125 /d. at 682. 
126 /d. The Board never admitted liability at any stage in these proceedings. 
127 /d. at 681 (quoting Memorandum of United States requesting entry of consent decree). 
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public interest. 128 Consequently, Judge Shadur suggested that inter-
venors wait until the Board had developed a plan, at which time the 
court could review "any arguable failure to protect [the prospective 
intervenors'] interests or inadequacy of representation" . by the 
DOJ.l29 
The court also stressed an essential difference between a consent 
decree settlement and a traditional, court-ordered desegregation 
remedy: 
Under the Consent Decree the primary responsibility for devel-
oping the plan is on the Board, and . . . [provided the Board plan 
is constitutional, this] Court will not superimpose its own views of 
what other constitutional means might be preferable. . . . 
Judges should not substitute their own judgment as to optimal 
settlement terms for the judgement of litigants and their 
counsel. 130 
At the same time, the court maintained that "[i]t has not abdicated 
its constitutional responsibilities, and if the litigants were to agree on 
a plan that did not conform to the Constitution, this Court would 
reject that plan."131 Judge Shadur has stated that his "Court is 
neither the intended designer nor the intended czar of the Chicago 
school system and its plan of desegregation."132 
3. Advent of the Reagan Administration 
Before the Board developed its plan, Ronald Reagan defeated 
Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential election. The Reagan DOJ's 
approach to desegregation generally was at odds with that of the 
Carter DOJ. The Chicago consent decree between the Carter DO] 
and the Board, however, paved the way for a major test of the Rea-
gan view. In July 1981, the Department-apparently influenced by 
attorneys familiar with the Carter DOJ's understanding of the de-
cree-rejected a proposed set of planning principles developed by the 
Board. 133 Later, however, the Department-apparently acting 
under new DO] policies-reversed its position, approving the school 
128 &e id. at 686. 
129 ld. For a discussion of arguments proffered by the NAACP in its efforts to intervene in 
the case subsequent to the Board's filing of a plan, see notes 156, 168, 186-90 i'!fra. 
130 Id. at 687, quoting Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 315 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
131 Id. 
132 554 F. Supp. at 914. 
133 Mirga, Busing Will Not Help to .Desegregate Chicago Schools, Federal Judge Rules, Eouc. 
WEEK, jan. 19, 1983, at 9. 
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system's adoption of a voluntary strategy. 134 
The Reagan DOJ categorically opposes mandatory pupil trans-
portation remedies.135 Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights 
William Bradford Reynolds has expressed concern that mandatory 
pupil transportation remedies "are threatening to dilute the essential 
(national) consensus that racial discrimination is wrong and should 
not be tolerated in any form," 136 and that involuntary busing "has 
failed to advance the overriding goal of equal educational opportu-
nity."137 He suggested that "[a]dherence to an experiment [such as 
busing] which has not withstood the test of experience obviously 
makes little sense."138 Instead of mandatory pupil transportation, 
DOJ now advances a remedial strategy program which includes 
"voluntary student assignment program[s], magnet schools, and en-
hanced curriculum requirements, faculty incentives, inservice train-
ing programs for teachers and administrators, school closings, if 
[there is] excess capacity, or new construction."139 
134 /d. 
135 The Reagan DOJ-in determining whether it should initiate a school desegregation 
lawsuit-also refuses to make use of the so-called K~es presumption that proof of intentional 
segregation in a significant portion of a school district infers that there was intentional segre-
gation in other racially imbalanced portions of the district. Su Keyes v. School District No. 1, 
Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973). This presumption was based on the Court's recognition 
of the difficulty of proving intentional segregation in northern and western school systems 
where segregation had not been mandated by state laws. The Supreme Court had devised 
the K~es presumption because it felt that "common sense dictates the conclusion that racially 
inspired school board actions have an impact beyond the particular schools that are subjects 
of those actions." 413 U.S. at 203. Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Reynolds 
offered the following rationale for DOJ's refusal to use Keyes in its decision to initiate litiga-
tion: "To avoid imposition of a systemwide desegregation plan, which often includes sys-
temwide busing, a school board subject to the K~es presumption must shoulder the difficult 
burden of proving that racial imbalance in schools elsewhere in the system is not attributable 
to school authorities." School Desegregation: Heanngs before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constilutz'onal 
Rights of the House Comm. on theJudici'ary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 617 (1982) (Testimony of Wil-
liam Bradford Reynolds) [hereinafter cited as Testimony]. 
136 Speech before the Delaware Bar Ass'n, at 9 (Feb., 1982). Mr. Reynolds also remarked 
on that occasion: 
The flight from urban public schools has eroded the tax base of many cities, which 
has in turn contributed to the growing inability of many school systems to provide 
high-quality education to their students-whether black or white. Similarly, the 
loss of parental support and involvement has robbed many public school systems of 
a critical component of successful educational programs. When one adds to these 
realities the growing empirical evidence that racially balanced public schools have 
failed to improve the educational achievement of the students, the case for 
mandatory busing collapses. 
137 Testimony, supra note 135, at 618. 
138 /d. 
139 !d. at 631. 
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B. The Di'stnct Court Upholds the Board~ Proposed Plan 
On January 22, 1982, the Board filed a proposed desegregation 
plan 140 which did not include any mandatory pupil reassignments. 
On February 11, 1982, the DOJ expressed its approval of the Board's 
voluntary plan_141 
The plan rested on the Board's policy strongly favoring volun-
tary means of desegregation: 
The Board has determined, based both on its experience and 
careful analysis, that desegregation techniques which are not 
compulsory on children are the most effective and most practica-
ble in achieving stable desegregation. Voluntary methods em-
phasize education. They provide to all children and their 
families the opportunity to attend a school because they believe 
that educational opportunities will result. These affirmative 
choices not only enhance desegregation, but do so in a positive 
manner which is supportive of the educational objectives of the 
school system. Therefore, they are the techniques which are the 
most likely to produce both stable desegregation and educational 
enrichment. 142 
The Board alleged that it was "more important to increase the 
number of children in desegregated schools than to try to cause indi-
vidual schools to conform to some preconceived racial composi-
tion. " 143 It claimed that its primary objective was to create "stable" 
desegregated schools.144 
There was extensive racial imbalance in the Chicago schools 
before the Board's plan. In 1980, 3 70 out of 584 public schools had 
minority populations of over eighty-five percent, while ninety-seven 
schools had minority populations under thirty-five percent.145 The 
Board, rather than trying to spread the seventeen percent white pop-
ulation throughout the system, established a goal of at least thirty-
five percent minority enrollment in the ninety-seven predominantly 
white schools. 146 The Board also sought to desegregate some 
predominantly minority schools by turning twenty-nine of them into 
140 Memorandum in Support of Board of Education's School Desegregation Plan, United 
States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 1982). 
141 The United States' Assessment of the Chicago School Board's Comprehensive Student 
Assignment Plan, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 1982). 
142 United States v. Board of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 917 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
143 Memorandum, supra note 140, at 14. 
144 /d. at 15. 
145 /d. at 25. 
146 /d. The Board contended "that predominantly minority schools (unlike predomi-
nantly white schools) cannot all attain the definition of desegregated schools." 554 F. Supp. 
at 918; su notes 172-80 1'i¢'a. 
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specialized magnet schools. 147 Since white student enrollment had 
been declining steadily as white families moved to the suburbs, 148 
"[t]he Board concluded that the desegregation techniques which 
would be most successful . . . would either be techniques which 
would continue children in nearby schools ... or ... which en-
courage but do not compel children to attend schools where their 
enrollment will be desegregative in nature.''149 The plan identified 
three categories of naturally "integrated schools,"150 whose stability 
the Board sought to preserve by limiting voluntary transfers. Be-
cause of Chicago's racially segregated housing patterns, most of these 
schools were composed of white and Hispanic students. 151 
In approving the Board's plan, the DO J recognized that 
[t]he plan is premised on the belief ... that there is a substantial 
number of parents who want to have their children enroll in inte-
grated schools in this manner and the belief is that a thorough 
recruitment and publicity campaign . . . can reduce racial and 
ethnic isolation in Chicago's public schools to the greatest extent 
practicable. 152 
The DO J agreed with the Board that "voluntary transfers can be 
more effective for black students because they historically have been 
more responsive to this technique than have other minority stu-
dents."153 It cited with approval a Board-funded survey of parents' 
attitudes that indicated that desegregation could be accomplished 
through the Board's proposed techniques. 154 Finally, the DOJ con-
cluded that the plan "creates a careful balance between the concepts 
of 'maintaining stability' and the right of minority students to 
147 Memorandum, supra note 140, at 31. 
148 /d. at 16. 
149 /d. at 17. 
150 The district court described these categories as follows: (1) "'stably integrated 
schools', which because they are now and are projected to remain naturally integrated [30% 
white and 30% minority minimum representation], ... are subjected to some limits on vol-
untary transfers;" (2) "schools now 'stably integrated' but with projected racial changes that 
would threaten that status--here various techniques. . . are adopted to preserve their present 
stability" and (3) "'stable mixed schools' (having 15-30% present and projected white enroll-
ment), as to which various techniques ... are intended to maintain or increase current levels 
of integration." 554 F. Supp. at 917. 
151 See 554 F. Supp. at 922 ("there is more natural integration of white and Hispanic 
children''), and notes 167-72 i'n.fra. 
152 Assessment, supra note 141, at 4. 
153 /d. at 17. 
154 /d. at 19-22. Despite this approval, the United States recognized "that the overall 
results of voluntary programs in Chicago have been disappointing in past years." /d. at 30. 
For a discussion of minority group comments concerning past voluntary programs, see notes 
181-8 7 i'nfta. 
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transfer."155 
1. Constitutional Arguments Against the Board's Plan 
The court ruled in the Board's favor on several constitutional 
objections raised by the NAACP. The first concerned the standard 
for integrated schools. The plan defined a school as "integrated" or 
"desegregated" if it had at least thirty percent minority and thirty 
percent white students. Consequently, although the Chicago system 
was only seventeen percent white, schools which were seventy per-
cent white would be considered desegregated. In practice, because of 
the sparcity of white students, "[a]fter two years of implementation 
[of the Chicago plan], 8,500 students remained in all-minority ele-
mentary schools, compared to 10,131 when implementation be-
gan."156 The court157 nevertheless concluded that the thirty percent 
majority /minority standard was in accord with school desegregation 
decisions in Milwaukee, 158 St. Louis, 159 Atlanta, 160 Dallas, 161 and 
Washington, D.C.162 Yet school desegregation decisions in Colum-
bus 163 Dayton 164 Charlotte-Mecklenberg 165 Nashville 166 and sev-
' ' ' ' 
eral other cities had required that strict attention be paid to black-
white student population ratios. 
Second, the court validated the plan's grouping of both blacks 
and Hispanics into a single "minority students" category. The Board 
argued that it was appropriate "to seek the desegregation of white 
155 Assessment, supra note 141, at 24. 
156 Memorandum, supra note 118, at 15. Buts~~ Reply Memorandum, supra note 119, at 
35-41. 
15 7 The Court, however, did suggest that the Board was sincere in its effort to desegregate 
Chicago schools. See, ~.g., 554 F. Supp. at 919-20 ("It is the Board's stated intention to con-
tinue to push for integration .... Nor is that just a paper commitment; it is real."). 
158 Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 311 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980). 
159 Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1296 & n.30 {8th Cir.), cn-t. deni'd, 449 U.S. 
826 (1980). 
160 Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 n.7 (N.D. Ga. 1973), ajj'd.following remand, 
522 F. 2d 717, 718 (5th Cir. 1975). 
161 Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 711 (N.D. Tex. 1981). But seeTasby v. Estes, 412 
F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Tex. 1976), r~v'd, 572 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1978), cn-1. deni~d, 444 U.S. 
437 (1980). 
162 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,411 n.9 (D.D.C. 1967), ajj'd sub nom. Smuck v. 
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
163 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); s~~ note 114 supra. 
164 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 536 (1979); see note 114 supra. 
165 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); see notes 
105-07 supra. 
166 Kelly v. Metropolitan Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167 (M.D. Tenn. 1980), r~v'd, 687 
F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982), cn-t. deni~d, 103 S. Ct. 834 (1983). 
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children from all groups of minority youngsters."167 Speaking for the 
other side, the NAACP suggested that because of the inclusive defini-
tion, "Chicago, a system which is 60% black, [will have] no more 
than 10% black students ... [participating] now, or in the future, in 
a 'system wide' desegregation plan, purportedly designed, inter alia, to 
remedy the present effects of segregation of black students." 168 In 
sum, the NAACP contended that the Board's plan did not meet the 
Green v. County School Board requirement that school boards come for-
ward with a plan "that promises realistically to work now." 169 The 
court upheld the Board, reasoning that "courts that have dealt with 
desegregation issues in multi-ethnic school districts have consistently 
approved plans with an inclusive definition of minorities like that 
adopted by the plan." 170 At the same time, the court noted that 
"there is a good deal to be said in policy terms on the other side of 
the issue."171 It acknowledged that "(i]n the practical sense, ... 
schools with (say) 65% white and 35% hispanic students [could be] 
counted as 'desegregated,' even though [they] contain ... no mem-
bers of the black population that itself makes up 60% of the entire 
school system." 112 
Third, the court ruled that the racial composition of Chicago's 
schools made desegregation of all minority schools unfeasible. 173 In-
stead, the court agreed with the Board's contention that desegre-
gating all primarily white schools would result in the greatest 
number of stably desegregated schools. 174 The court based its deci-
sion on the proposition of Millzlcen v. Bradley, 175 "that the continued 
existence of one-race schools [does not] pose the kind of clear uncon-
stitutionality requiring disapproval of a desegregation plan." 176 Mil-
lzlcen narrowly held that desegregation "does not require any 
particular racial balance in each school, grade, or classroom." 177 But 
Millzlcen did not involve a desegregation plan, such as Chicago's, 
167 Memorandum, supra note 119, at 47. 
168 /d. at 30. 
169 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). According to the NAACP, "[w]here it cannot be shown that 
allowing free choice or free transfer would not further delay student desegregation, such tech-
niques are constitutionally unacceptable." Memorandum, supra note 118, at 31. 
170 554 F. Supp. at 921. For a list of references, see id. at 921 n.11. 
171 /d. at 921. 
172 /d. at 920-21; see notes 145, 151 supra. 
173 554 F. Supp. at 923 ("In a largely minority school system like Chicago's, .. . it is not 
feasible to desegregate all the primarily minority schools ... . "). 
174 Reply Memorandum, supra note 119, at 42. 
175 418U.S.717(1974). 
176 554 F. Supp. at 923 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U .S. 717, 740-741 (1974)). 
177 418 U.S. at 740-41. 
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which would not alter the racial composition of most predominatly 
black schools. 178 In fact, in 1977 the Supreme Court affirmed a Sixth 
Circuit ruling in a related case, Brad!~ v. Milliken, 179 that rejected as 
erroneous the Detroit school board's argument that "mere elimina-
tion of identifiably white schools satisfied the criteria of Brown."180 
The last substantive issue resolved by the district court in Chi-
cago concerned the plan's failure to use mandatory pupil reassign-
ment techniques. To support its premise that "[t]he use of 
desegregative techniques other than compulsory transportation will 
produce the maximum feasible degree of stable desegregation,"181 
the Board expressed its general preference for neighborhood schools 
and "pointed to the results of a NORC 182 survey which indicated 
that a mandatory busing program would accelerate the decline of 
white enrollment in the system."183 Accepting the Board's estimate 
of the likely effect of mandatory busing, and recognizing the Board's 
broad authority under the consent decree, the district court approved 
the Board's approach. 184 It found that "[u]nder the circumstances 
here the Board cannot be faulted in constitutional terms for not hav-
ing ventured needlessly onto that battlefield."185 
The NAACP and Urban League strongly differed with the 
court's ruling on mandatory reassignments. Both groups noted that 
"there is a long track record in Chicago establishing the ineffective-
ness of voluntary free choice techniques to make any meaningful im-
pact in reducing the severe racial isolation in the district's 
schools."186 They argued that 
the plan contains an unstated assumption on which many of the 
plan's features depend-namely-that the danger of white flight 
is so imminent and would be so destructive that it is the overrid-
ing consideration to be avoided at all costs. The extreme pre-
eminence accorded this viewpoint is racist and thus 
178 Se-e notes 145-46, 148, and 167 supra. 
179 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), qffd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
180 540 F.2d at 139; see also Memorandum, note 118, at 15-17. 
181 554 F. Supp. at 924 (quoting plan at 271). 
182 National Opinion Research Center. 
183 554 F. Supp. at 924. 
184 The DOJ Assessment approaches this issue in a similar manner. &~Assessment, supra 
note 141, at 13-14, 19-22. The district court noted, howeyer, that " [t]his opinion reserves 
judgment on the propriety of these limitations. [For the future may] . . . demonstrate . . . a 
need for mandatory busing .... " 554 F. Supp. at 924 n.12. 
185 554 F. Supp. at 926. 
186 Memorandum, supra note 118, at 33-35; s~~also Chicago Urban League, supra note 121, 
at 35-37. The Board, however, argued that problems of design, implementation, and finance 
were the cause of problems in the earlier plan. &~ Brief, supra note 88, at 30-33. 
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unconstitutional. 187 
These comments are in accord with other courts' reasoning in deseg-
regation decisions. 18 8 In Nashville, 189 for example, the Sixth Circuit 
virtually ignored the district court's findings as to the ineffectiveness 
of the busing remedy and ordered county-wide busing. Another al-
leged flaw in the plan that the NAACP especially noted was its fail-
ure to focus on the racial isolation of black schoolchildren: 
[W]ith very few exceptions, no black or other minority student 
not now in, what the Board considers a desegregated or inte-
grated school, will be provided an integrated education unless he 
or she transfers to a white receiving school or a magnet or metro-
politan school/scholastic academy. Conversely, every white child 
in the district is guaranteed to receive an integrated education 
without having to leave his/her neighborhood school. 190 
2. Assessment of the Court's Ruling 
It is difficult to assess whether the Chzcago court acted improp-
erly in denying the NAACP's motion to intervene or in upholding 
the Board's plan. The plan offered the advantages of being both po-
litically popular and a quick response to the problem of racial imbal-
ance in Chicago schools. Additionally, there exists a judicial 
presumption that the government will adequately represent the 
"public interest." Finally, since the consent decree was contractual 
in nature, it was to be expected that the Board would have discretion 
to develop a plan within the broad parameters of the decree and the 
Constitution. Correlative to this, a consent decree need only provide 
for a constitutionally acceptable remedy. On the other hand, the 
plan's failure to set goals of acceptable levels of desegregation, com-
bined with its conclusive definition of minority students, is problem-
atic given the Supreme Court's mandate in Brown that school systems 
have an "affirmative duty" to come forward with a plan "that 
promises realistically to work now." 
The Reagan administration found the court's decision "ex-
tremely encouraging." 191 "The court found the plan to be clearly 
within the broad range of constitutionaly acceptable remedies," com-
mented William Bradford Reynolds, the assistant attorney general 
187 Urban League, supra note 121, at 49; see also Memorandum, supra note 118, at 19. 
188 See Memorandum, supra note 118, at 19; notes 152-55 supra. 
189 Kelly v. Metropolitan Bd. ofEduc., 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982); sua/so Devins, School 
Desegregation Law in the 1980's, 1984 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1. 
190 Memorandum, supra note 118, at 46. 
191 Mirga, supra note 133, at 9. 
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for civil rights. 192 "We remain confident that the proper implemen-
tation of this plan, which is based mainly on magnet schools and 
voluntary transfers, can achieve more lasting desegregation than a 
mandatory student reassignment plan."193 
The court's approval of the plan is a breakthrough for the Rea-
gan DOJ. It allows the administration to pursue its antibusing poli-
cies by entering into similar consent decrees with school districts 
subject to desegregation obligations. 194 The Chicago decision also 
supports administration moves to give state and local education sys-
tems greater authority. 19s 
Chicago, through its recognition of the Board's expansive power 
under the consent decree, suggests that the executive can vest sub-
stantial authority in state and local school systems to monitor their 
own desegregation activities. Although such "divestiture" represents 
a dramatic shift from the pre-Reagan enforcement of federal civil 
rights statutes and equal protection clause guarantees, responsible ju-
dicial supervision of local school desegregation efforts can ensure that 
school systems satisfy the terms of constitutionally acceptable consent 
decrees. The Chicago case may foster this. Chicago also demonstrated 
that the scope of a desegregation order may be defined by the parties 
involved in the lawsuit and not the preferences of outside interest 
groups. The DOJ agreed to the plan, and the court, by denying sev-
eral motions to intervene, refused to allow minority groups to raise 
their constitutional objections to the plan directly. 196 
III. The Chicago Board of Education Sues to Obtain Federal 
Financial Assistance 
The district court's approval did not end litigation over the Chi-
cago desegregation plan. Even after the DOJ "praised the Board's 
implementation of the Plan as 'excellent' and 'in good faith' ... , 
and the District Court has found that the Board's efforts to meet its 
obligations under the Consent Decree [to be] in good faith," 197 the 
192 /d. 
193 /d. 
194 This has already happened in Bakersfield, California, and Lima, Ohio. See Mirga & 
Caldwell, supra note 93, at 1. 
195 See notes 63-64 supra. 
196 Since the district court upheld the plan as constitutional, it is unlikely that future 
efforts to intervene or collateral attacks can be successfully maintained. In fact, in a related 
action, the district court denied a motion to intervene in Chicago for precisely this reason. 
Johnson v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
197 Brief, supra note 88, at 2. 
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issue remained of who should fund the plan. Section 15.1 of the con-
sent decree provided that "[e]ach party is obligated to make every 
good faith effort to find and provide every available form of financial 
resources adequate for the implementation of the desegregation 
plan."198 Whether this provision requires the federal government to 
provide special desegregation assistance to Chicago is presently the 
subject of litigation in United States v. Board o.f Education199 ("Chicago 
II"). 
On June 30, 1983, Judge Shadur ruled that the decree obligated 
the United States to provide assistance.200 To reinforce his order, 
Judge Shadur froze approximately $250 million of federal education 
funds.201 Because of the district court's ruling, Congress had allo-
cated-over executive objection-202 $20 million dollars to the Chi-
cago school system.203 The Seventh Circuit affirmed on September 
9, 1983.204 
A. The ~wew Federalism~~ and Chicago II 
Chicago II raises several issues significant to understanding the 
effects of the "new federalism." First, federal expenditures under the 
current block grant do not appear to provide sufficient support for 
expansive desegregation remedies.205 Second, effective voluntary de-
segregation techniques-although not involving the cost of busing-
may be more expensive than mandatory ones.206 Third, the "new 
federalism" did not provide for transitional assistance to school dis-
tricts which had relied on ESAA and similar programs to ensure ade-
quate funding for their desegregation plans.207 Finally, proponents 
of the "new federalism" focus on reducing federal involvement in lo-
cal educational decisionmaking; albeit an important concern, it is 
one that may limit federal action on behalf of minority students.208 
198 Consent Decree, supra note 95, at 12, § 15.1. 
199 567 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ill.), ajfd, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983). 
200 567 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
201 ld at 285-90. 
202 See notes 256-58 infta. 
203 See notes 250-262 infra. 
204 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983). On August 13, 1984, the district court entered a judg-
ment for $103.858 million against the United States. Order, United States v. Board of Educ., 
No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 1984). 
205 See notes 72-75 supra. 
206 The costs for voluntary desegregation using magnet schools may be substantial and 
may in some instances surpass those of mandatory assignment plans. Caldwell, Magnt'l 
Schools: The New Hope for Voluntary Desegregation, Eouc. WEEK, Feb. 29, 1984, at 1, 15- 16. 
207 See notes 72-75 supra. 
208 See notes 63-64 supra. But see note 5 supra. 
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In its appeal brief, the Board contended that the government 
had "entered into a consent decree by which it agreed, ... under 
judicial supervision, to be mutually responsible with a school board 
for funding a desegregation plan."209 The Board felt that this obliga-
tion amounted to a specific commitment to Chicago, not merely a 
general obligation that permitted Chicago to compete with other 
school districts for congressionally-authorized education funds. The 
DOJ disagreed, and claimed that the consent decree "does not re-
quire the Executive Branch . . . to prefer Chicago over other school 
districts . . . in dispensing federal financial assistance and structur-
ing federal assistance programs."210 On May 31, 1983, the Board 
petitioned for an order directing the United States to comply with 
Section 15.1 of the decree.211 The cases required the court to deter-
mine what constitutes a "good faith effort" by the government, and 
which funds were "available" for Chicago school desegregation. 
A primary cause of the funding dispute in Chicago was the sub-
stantial reduction in federal desegregation assistance resulting from 
the "new federalism" in education as it was partially translated into 
legislation.212 According to the Board: 
Since federal fiscal year 1981, the Executive Branch has been en-
gaged in a continuous effort to strip away all means by which it 
could fulfill the United States' obligations under the Consent De-
cree. Despite the continued availability of financial resources 
[still available to the Secretary of Education], the Executive 
Branch has provided virtually no direct financial support for the 
Board's desegregation efforts.213 
The Board cited the administration's failure to support desegregation 
efforts or make a special effort to use available funds, noting that 
President Reagan vetoed legislation designed specifically to assist 
Chicago.214 It further suggested that the administration was openly 
hostile to its efforts to secure federal desegregation assistance. 
209 Brief, supra note 88, at 1. 
210 Brieffor the United States at 16, United States v. Board of Educ., Nos. 83-2308, 83-
2402, 83-2445 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 1983). The Board requested both declaratory and injunctive 
relief. 
211 &i! 717 F.2d at 380. (Specifically, "The Board asked the district court."). 
212 &i! notes 256-58 infta; Si!i! also notes 72-73 and 110 supra. 
213 Brief, supra note 88, at 10. The Board also noted both its compliance with the consent 
decree and its need for financial support. The Board contended that "[i]n a period of severe 
financial constraint, desegregation implementation has been the only programmatic area in 
which the Board has continually increased its annual level of expenditure. . . . In spite of 
the Board's efforts, however, it does not have financial resources adequate for full implemen-
tation of the Plan." /d. at 8. 
214 /d. at 10-11; Si!i! note 250 iiifra. 
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The Board's failures in working with the federal government led 
to the filing of Chicago II. The first issue the court addressed required 
it to determine, from the decree's "four corners,"215 the parties' intent 
in Section 15.1216 
The district court unequivocally held that the United States had 
an affirmative obligation to assist the Board's efforts to secure federal 
funding. It found that "the United States' promise to make every 
good faith effort" to find and provide available funds entailed a "se-
rious and substantial obligation."217 The court further noted that 
this obligation required consistency in federal policy; the government 
"could not in good faith, having entered into the Consent Decree, 
work actively to make financial resources unavailable."218 
In its appeal, the DOJ vigorously challenged these rulings. It 
alleged that the court improperly read Section 15.1 as (1) a guaran-
tee of federal financial support,219 (2) "an open-ended commitment 
to provide federal assistance,"220 and (3) a limitation on the range 
within which the executive branch would determine national educa-
tional policy and related legislative proposals.221 
The Board, in turn, suggested that the government misinter-
preted both the consent decree and the district court's order. It 
viewed Section 15.1 as "a substantial affirmative promise."222 The 
215 567 F. Supp. at 281. 
216 The case did not raise the issue of the enforceability of consent decrees. The court 
simply stated: "Consent decrees are binding orders that have the same force as any other 
judgment. Accordingly, the Consent Decree is fully enforceable by this court." 567 F. Supp. 
at 281. 
217 /d. at 283. 
218 /d. at 282. 
219 See Brief, supra note 210, at 17, 36. For example, in Fox v. Dep't. of Housing and 
Urban Development, 680 F.2d 315 (3rd Cir. 1982), the Third Circuit interpreted a consent 
decree in which HUD agreed to use its best efforts to obtain necessary federal approvals for 
construction of a specific housing project to be built according to the terms of the decree. The 
Third Circuit held that this "best efforts" clause was not an "undertaking by HUD, express or 
implied, to provide .. . financing." /d. at 320; see also cases cited in Brief, supra note 210, at 
18. 
220 Brief, supra note 210, at 17. 
221 See Brief, supra note 88, at 20, 47. 
222 /d. at 19. In support of this contention the Board referred to Brewster v. Dukakis, 675 
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) ("Best efforts" obligation includes appeal to legislature for appropria-
tion of funding.); Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 837 (D. Mass 1982) ("Best efforts" implies 
"all steps within their lawful authority."); Geiser v. United States, 627 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 
1980) (" Best efforts" entails a serious affirmative obligation.). 
As to the meaning of the Consent Decree, the Board argued: 
On its face,§ 15.1 of the Consent Decree plainly creates a mutual obligation of 
the parties to do everything possible to provide financing to assure the success of the 
Plan. The word "find" describes an obligation to identify and procure potential 
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"new federalism" in education, which resulted in the elimination of 
ESAA and other programs, consequently was seen by the Board as a 
breach of the government's "substantial affirmative promise."223 
The Board further pointed to government memoranda interpreting 
Section 15.1 which said that "each party is obligated to search for 
every available means to provide adequate financial resources for the 
implementation of the Desegregation Plan,"224 and that the Board 
should "receive the maximum amount of financial and technical 
assistance that this Department [of Education] can provide."225 
The Board's contention, that the federal government had obli-
gated itself to provide funding to implement the desegregation 
plan, 226 raises the second significant factual issue in Chicago II: 
whether the Department of Education had ready access to funds 
which could help support Chicago school desegregation. In af-
firming the district court's order, the Seventh Circuit placed great 
emphasis on these questions of fact. It first noted that Section 15.1 
was written in language so broad as to be ambiguous. 227 Conse-
quently, it based its determination on extrinsic evidence introduced 
by the Board and DOJ. The Seventh Circuit found persuasive gov-
ernment memoranda-introduced by the Board-that suggested 
that Chicago receive the maximum amount of desegregation assist-
ance available to the Department of Education.228 
Based on this determination, the appellate court next had to 
means of funding. "Provide" obviously means to give such funding to the Board. 
"Every available" refers to funds that are or might be made subject to a party's 
control. "Adequate for implementation of the Plan" serves to limit the parties' obli-
gations to amounts necessary to carry out the Plan. This language of§ 15.1 is of 
course preceded by the phrase "every good faith effort" which, while not a guaran-
tee, clearly requires a most serious and substantial effort to attain the result de-
scribed in the provision. 
Brief, supra note 88, at 17. 
223 See notes 63-75 supra for a discussion of Reagan administration programs. 
224 See Brief, supra note 88, at 25. 
225 /d. 
226 The School Board alleged that: 
Only after applying§ 15.1 to the current facts of this case and determining that at 
least SIS million is currently available to the Executive Branch which could be pro-
vided to the Board, and that at least $14.6 million is needed for adequate implemen-
tation of the Plan which cannot be provided by the Board despite its good faith 
efforts, did the District Court conclude that the United States is obligated to provide 
funding of at least $14.6 million for the current year. 
Brief, supra note 88, at 15. 
227 "[A]side from the board language that permeates all of 15.1 the word 'available' is 
capable of more than one meaning." 717 F.2d at 382. 
228 See id. at 383; see also notes 224-25 supra. 
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reach the issue of whether the government had acted in good faith. 
The district court had held that the government had breached its 
obligation on two grounds. First, the "new federalism" violated the 
consent decree's "good faith" requirement (since these policies re-
duced the amount of federal funds provided to local educational 
agencies for desegregation expenses),229 and second, the government 
breached its "good faith" obligation by failing to direct available 
funds to the Board.230 On the first ground, the Seventh Circuit re-
marked that "a significant constitutional issue may exist as to 
whether a finding of lack of good faith properly can be based upon 
such a series of sweeping Executive policy decisions and recommen-
dations."231 It did not reach that question, however.232 Instead, it 
affirmed the district court's rulings on the more limited ground that 
the Department of Education could have directed more funds to Chi-
cago school desegregation. 233 
The DO J contended before the appellate court both that ade-
quate funds were available to the Board and that no other sources 
were available to finance Chicago school desegregation. It stressed 
that "[i]n fiscal year 1982, the Board received $6.3 million under 
229 Su 567 F. Supp. at 283; set also 717 F.2d at 383. 
230 See 567 F. Supp. at 284-85; .m also 717 F .2d at 383. 
231 717 F.2d at 383. In its brief, the United States suggested that "[t]he district court's 
error in interpreting the decree is magnified by its order denying essential funding to grantees 
selected by Congress or the Executive and simultaneously seeking a reversal of Congressional 
and Executive discretionary decisions." Brief, supra note 210, at 4 7. In support of this conten-
tion, the United States cited Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U .S. 519 (1978). In that case, the Supreme Court held that courts 
should defer to the policy choices made by executive officials in carrying out their statutory 
directives "[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances." /d. at 
543. The United States also questioned the scope of the district court remedy as an abuse of 
discretion. See text accompanying note 221 supra. 
In seeking to refute this claim, the Board contended that: 
The basic purpose of the separation of powers doctrine, to serve as a check against 
oppression and prevent the accumulation of power in one branch of government, 
would certainly not be served by permitting the Executive Branch to negotiate and 
enter an agreement, in which it undertook to "make every good faith effort" to 
provide financing for the Plan, and then render its promise meaningless through 
later "discretionary" actions. 
Brief, supra note 88, at 44. 
The Board further noted that the Executive was not forced either to violate congressional 
restrictions on education funds or introduce legislation to provide money for the Plan. See id. 
at 38-39. The United States argued that this Board claim was in error. See Brief, supra note 
210, at 38-45. The district and appellate courts both resolved this tssue in favor of the Board, 
however. See notes 237-46 infta. 
232 717 F.2d at 383 ("That important question, however, need not be addressed at this 
time, in light of this court's direction regarding the remedies .... ") . 
233 /d. 
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Chapter 2 of ECIA, almost double what it had received in the ante-
cedent programs to Chapter 2. All of those funds are, by statute, 
available for desegregation expenses at the Board's discretion."234 
The DO J further noted that in FY 1983 more than ten million addi-
tional dollars were potentially available to the Board for its desegre-
gation program than in 1982.235 Finally, it argued that "many of the 
expenses designated by the Board as desegregation expenses would 
be incurred regardless of whether the Board was implementing its 
plan."235 
The Board sought to refute these arguments by noting that it 
would have been eligible for the same amount of desegregation assist-
ance had it not entered into the consent decree or implemented a 
desegregation plan. 237 The Board implied that it never would have 
"agree( d) to develop and implement a costly plan . . . in exchange 
for money it already had."238 The district court agreed with the 
Board and held that the "Board cannot obtain adequate financing 
for full implementation of the Plan without receiving financial help 
from other sources, including the United States."239 
In addition to claiming that it had adequately funded Chicago 
school desegregation, the DOJ argued that no additional funds were 
available to assist Chicago. It suggested that statutory and regula-
tory guidelines prohibited additional expenditures on Chicago school 
desegregation.240 The district court, following the Board's analysis of 
234 Reply Brief for the United States at 14, United States v. Board ofEduc., Nos. 83-2308, 
83-2402, 83-2445, (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 1983). School boards, however, generally do not spend 
these funds on desegregation related activities. Another analysis reached a different conclu-
sion concerning Chicago's funding experience under the block grant. See note 277 i'nfta. 
235 See Brief, supra note 210, at 12-13. 
236 Reply Brief, supra note 234, at 14. The government noted: "For example, the Board 
considers rehabilitation of school buildings in racially isolated areas a desegregation cost even 
though it would admittedly have to undertake such repairs in any event." /d. 
237 Brief, supra note 88, at 32. 
238 /d. Yet before the Board entered into the consent decree, it was ineligible to receive 
funds specifically designated for desegregation-related activities. See notes 3-12 supra. 
239 567 F. Supp. at 283. 
240 See Brief, supra note 210, at 38-46. The Government's brief specified limitations on 
several aid programs identified by the district court and school board: (1) Title IV of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (training and advisory services) where the government claimed that 
"[iJn order to permit the Board to receive any substantial award under Title IV this year, the 
current competition for State educational agency awards would have to be overturned, and 
the Department of Education would have to cancel its commitment to make continuation 
awards for desegregation assistance centers." Brief, supra note 210, at 39; (2) ECIA Chapter 2 
where the government argued that "[tJhe Secretary of Education has no authority granted by 
the statute or regulation to direct the states' allocation of Chapter 2 funds to local education 
agencies." /d. at 42; (3) ECIA-Discretionary Funds where the government alleged that "any 
grant made to the Board would have to fund costs other than general operating costs incurred 
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the relevant statutes and regulations,241 had found that "[f]unds are 
currently available in the Discretionary Fund and in the Special Pro-
grams and Populations Fund, in amounts exceeding $15 million, that 
could be provided by the Secretary of Education to the Board for 
desegregation assistance. "242 
The district court had granted the Board's request for the $14.6 
million in federal aid which the Board claimed was required "for full 
implementation" of its costly, voluntary desegregation plan.243 The 
court found that the Secretary of Education had access to approxi-
mately $35 million in unobligated Title IV and discretionary 
funds.244 Based on these rulings, it "directed the United States to 
undertake an affirmative program of making every good faith effort 
to find and provide the $14.6 million and such other funding as the 
court may determine."245 
in implementing the desegregation plan." ld. at 44; and (4) the government claimed that a 
variety of regulations would make impracticable the reprogramming of "[f]unds appropriated 
for Women's Educational Equity, Follow Through, Aid to the Virgin Islands, and Territorial 
Teacher Training . . . . " ld. at 45. 
241 See Brief, supra note 88, at 34-38. The Board directly challenged each of those DOJ 
contentions. Specifically, it suggested that the Secretary of Education has authority to read-
just specific program allocations. According to the Board, 
Congress provides funds to the Department of Education through lump sum appro-
priations to various budget (or appropriation) accounts. Each account encompasses 
several programs administered by the Department of Education and operates as the 
Department's conduit for distributing funds to its various programs. . . . The pro-
grams which compromise SPP [Special Programs and Populations Appropriation, 
which was the primary source available to the United States] include Title IV, the 
Secretary's Discretionary Fund, the Ellender Fellowship, Woman's Educational Eq-
uity, and the Follow Through Program. 
Brief, supra note 88, at 35 n. *. 
242 567 F. Supp. at 286. 
243 Brief, supra note 88, at 8. 
244 See 567 F. Supp. at 276, 278. 
245 717 F.2d at 383. The appellate court further described the exact contours of the dis-
trict court opinion: 
This affirmative program is to include, to the extent necessary to meet the obliga-
tions of the United States: (I) efforts to provide the Board with funds that remain 
available for local desegregation assistance and that are located in the Secretary of 
Education's Discretionary Fund and the Special Programs and Populations Ac-
count (which included Title IV monies); (2) efforts to secure congressional consent 
for the reallocation of excess funds from the Department's Guaranteed Student 
Loan Program into a fund from which support may be provided to implement the 
Board's desegregation plan; (3) efforts to identify other available monies or to 
reprogram or reallocate others excess monies; (4) support of legislative initiatives 
that would provide desegregation funding to school districts that have entered into 
consent decrees; (5) efforts to fund grantees and projects, which the Department had 
intended to fund through the Discretionary Fund and the Special Programs and 
Populations Account, with monies from other sources; and (6) cooperation with the 
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The Seventh Circuit, although agreeing that the government 
had breached its good faith obligation, vacated most of the district 
court's affirmative program. It felt that "it is not clear from the rec-
ord before us that the United States had an adequate opportunity to 
challenge the remedies selected by the district court, particularly the 
$14.6 million figure,"246 and to have additional hearings to deter-
mine the proper level of government funding. 247 In addition, it 
found that the lower court had acted too hastily: 
The district court acted with excessive dispatch in delineating 
specific remedies immmediately after finding a violation of Sec-
tion 15.1. Where another branch of government is found to be in 
violation of a court order, courts have shown a preference for al-
lowing that branch to come into compliance voluntarily before 
imposing specific remedial measures. 248 
But to ensure adequate relief for the Board, the Seventh Circuit up-
held the injunction against spending unobligated funds.249 
The Seventh Circuit's ruling in Chicago II was quite narrow. 
Board to identify the Board's desegregation activities that are eligible for funding 
under Title IV. 
In its order of June 30, the district court also enjoined the United States from 
spending or taking action to obligate funds that are available for providing desegre-
gation funding to the Board and that are located both in the Secretary of Educa-
tion's Discretionary Fund and in the Department's Special Programs and 
Populations Account. (citations omitted). In addition, the June 30 order directed 
the United States to undertake an affirmative program to preserve the availability 
of excess funds (including student loan funds) in the amount of $250 million that 
potentially can be used by the United States to fulfill its obligations under the De-
cree for the next five years. 
/d. at 382-84. 
246 /d. at 385. 
247 Ste id. 
248 /d. at 384. &eJ e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977)(district court in-
junction designed to compel state to provide additional financing for hospitals vacated so as 
to permit the legislature to provide the financing on its own initiative); Phem v. Malkom, 507 
F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974) (similar injunction vacated to allow New York City either to submit a 
remedial plan or at least offer suggestions for a judicial remedy). 
The appellate court's conclusion on this issue seems particularly appropriate in light of 
the broad sweep of the district court remedy. With its $14.6 million order and $250 million 
freeze, the district court remedy substantially impacted on several other education programs. 
In its brief, the government noted: 
The district court's order goes so far as to hold hostage funds appropriated by Con-
gress for very specific purposes--(Aid to the Virgin Islands, Women's Educational 
Equity, etc.) having no relationship to desegregation assistance. This action effec-
tively extinguishes the rights and expectations of hundreds of grantees and benefi-
ciaries under these programs, none of whom were a party to these proceedings. 
Brief, supra note 210, at 49; ste also note 254 i'nfta. 
249 717 F.2d at 385. 
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The court limited itself to issues of fact, not legal principles. It con-
curred with the district court's finding that the government had an 
affirmative obligation to provide available funds to the Board, and 
that the Secretary of Education had access to additional monies 
which he could have directed to the Board. More interesting than 
these questions of fact, however, was the manner in which the execu-
tive and legislative branches responded to the district court's 
decision. 
B. Legislative and Executive Responses to Chicago 
In response to the district court's ruling, Congress sought to 
make additional monies available to enable the United States to 
comply with its obligations under the consent decree.250 On August 
13, 1983, President Reagan vetoed one congressional effort,251 but 
subsequently signed into law legislation continuing, among many ap-
propriations, funding for Chicago.252 
Congress had two motives for seeking to approve this funding. 
First, it intended to assist Chicago's implementation of a desegrega-
tion plan; second, it wanted to encourage the district court to lift the 
freeze on over $250 million in congressionally-authorized education 
programs. With regard to the former reason, Congressman Yates (D-
Ill.) remarked that "approving this amendment will [make it] possi-
ble to begin carrying out the agreement between the board of educa-
tion and the Federal Government in accordance with the order of the 
Court in the case."253 Representative Conte (R-Mass.) directed his 
remarks to the issue of alleviating the burden placed on federal edu-
cation programs by the district court's order. He argued: 
The Department of Education should release these funds [to be 
appropriated for Chicago] only upon receiving assurance that the 
250 On July 29, 1983, the House agreed to an amendment to H.R. 3069, Supplemental 
Appropriations, 1983, which would have provided $20 million for Chicago from unobligated 
Guaranteed Student Loan funds. 129 CONG. REC. H5990-991 (daily ed. July 29, 1983). Due 
to an enrolling error, that amendment was not included in the bill sent to, and approved by, 
the Senate and subsequently signed into law. 129 GoNG. REc. H6127 (daily ed. Aug. l, 
1983). As a result, H.J. Res. 338 was passed by both Houses to "correct" P.L. 98-63 and 
appropriate the $20 million for Chicago. 129 GONG. REc. H6127 (daily ed. Aug. l, 1983); 
129 GONG. REC. S11293 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1983). The measure was vetoed. See note 251 infta. 
251 H. J. Res., 338, 129 GONG. REC. H6127 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1983). 
252 Congress approved language appropriating the $20 million for Chicago in H.J. Res. 
368, which contained appropriations for many federal agencies and programs. 129 GoNG. 
REC. H7623-625 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983); 129 CoNG. REC. S13184 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983). 
This resolution was signed into law on Oct. 1, 1983. Pub. L. No. 98-107, 97 Stat. 733 (1983). 
253 129 GONG. REC. H5990 (daily ed. July 29, 1983) (remarks of Rep. Yates). 
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judicially imposed impoundment of discretionary funds for ele-
mentary and secondary education will be lifted. Otherwise, the 
States and cities affected by the judge's order will get no relief 
from this amendment. . 254 
1283 
Congressman Conte also suggested that the Chicago situation 
pointed to the need for Congress to revitalize ESAA.255 
In the letter accompanying the announcement of his veto of 
House Joint Resolution 338 (to correct an enrollment error in P.L. 
98-63), President Reagan noted "the extraordinarily important con-
stitutional principles raised by this particular measure."256 Specifi-
cally, he thought unconstitutional the district court's order freezing 
funds "appropriated by Congress for other educational programs. "257 
He based his veto "upon [his] conviction that its process of separated 
powers and checks and balances does not permit the judiciary to de-
termine spending priorities or to reallocate funds appropriated by 
Congress. "258 
Congress responded to that veto by adding to a continuing reso-
lution language appropriating $20 million to Chicago from unobli-
gated Guaranteed Student Loan funds. 259 Congress also 
subsequently passed the so-called Weicker amendment, which sought 
to lift the district court's freeze on other federal education pro-
grams.260 As incorporated into Public Law 98-13.9, this provision 
254 /d. (remarks of Rep. Conte). Similarly, Representative Yates noted: "[B]ecause of the 
Court's actions, the Follow Through grant for New Haven has been cut to $21,714 [from 
S 173, 713]. Follow Through grants for 76 other systems are similarly affected." /d. (comment 
of Rep. Yates). Su note 248 supra. 
255 Congressman Conte stated: 
[I]f this situation requires any further resolution, the way it should be resolved is 
through the reauthorization of the Emergency School Assistance Act. As the Mem-
bers will recall, this reauthorization has passed the House, on suspension, and is 
pending in the Senate. Any further action on this situation in the Appropriations 
Committee should depend upon that reauthorization. There are many other cities 
whose desegregation plans have been thrown into disarray, and it is not fair that one 
city should receive special treatment, at least prior to a final disposition of this case. 
129 CONG. REC. H5990 (daily ed. July 29, 1983) (statement of Rep. Conte); see notes 279-95 
i'nfta. 
256 Press Release, The White House, Aug. 13, 1983. 
257 /d. 
258 /d. This congressional action and executive veto were of no signifi~nce in the appel-
late court order. Since the appellate court based its decision on narrow "availability of 
funds" grounds, the issue of possible executive hostility to Chicago's (or any other school 
district's) desegregation efforts was not reached by the appellate court. This issue was briefed 
by both parties, however. See Brief, supra note 88, at 11; Reply Brief, supra note 234, at 11-12. 
259 Pub. L. 98-107, 97 Stat. 733 (1983). 
260 This amendment originally read: 
No funds appropriated in any act to the Department of Education for 1983 and 
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read: 
No funds appropriated in any Act to the Department of Educa-
tion for fiscal years 1983 and 1984 shall be withheld from distri-
bution to grantees because of the provisions of the order entered 
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois on June 30, 1983: Provided, that the court's decree en-
tered on September 24, 1980, shall remain in full force and 
effect.261 
Despite the provision's limiting language, Senator Weicker (R., 
Conn.) noted that "[i]f additional funds were required to satisfy this 
case beyond the $20 million [now] available, we will do whatever we 
can to provide these funds at the appropriate time. " 262 
C. Judge Shadur:SJune ~ 1981- Opimon 
In response to the Seventh Circuit's remand of Chicago II, Judge 
Shadur issued an opinion suggesting that the "United States is obli-
gated to make every good faith effort to find and provide $103.858 
million" for the 1984-85 school year.263 He also found that the 
United States had failed to meet its obligation to "fashion its own 
proposed remedy,"264 but suggested that he might lift his freeze on 
various federal education programs.:i6s 
The key to this particular opinion was the court's flat rebuff to 
three DOJ arguments. First, Judge Shadur rejected the separation of 
powers argument that his earlier decision was "choking off deserving 
education programs."266 Second, he rejected the United States' con-
1984 other than those appropriated by section 111 of Public Law 98-107 shall be 
available to fund the consent decree of 1980 between the United States and the 
Board of Education of the City of Chicago. 
129 CoNe. REC. Sl3,506 (Oct. 4, 1983)(remarks of Sen. Weicker). 
261 Pub. Law 98-139, § 209, 97 Stat. 871, 895 (Oct. 31, 1983). 
262 129 CONG. REC. S13,506 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Weicker). 
263 United States v. Board of Educ., 588 F. Supp. 132, 221 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
264 /d. at 211. Judge Shadur ruled that "[a]ll of the conduct of the United States . . 
including its promulgation of regulations and proposals of legislation intended to render 
funds unavailable to [the] Board for use in implementating the Plan ... constitutes both bad 
faith conduct and willful violations of the Consent Decree and orders of this Court and the 
Court of Appeals." !d. at 212. 
265 !d. at 233-34. 
266 /d. at 138. Judge Shadur stated: 
Because the United States has deliberately violated its original agreement to fund 
the Chicago Desegregation Plan, this Court has reluctantly found it necessary to 
prevent the distribution to other possible grantees of United States educational 
funds, in order to preserve access to all the dollars that would be potentially avail-
able to fund the honoring of the United States' freely-undertaken (and freely bro-
ken) obligation to the Board. 
[Vol. 59:1243] NEW FEDERALISM IN EDUCATION 1285 
tention that Chicago should spend available federal funds on school 
desegregation, claiming that "[s]uch a standard-forcing the robbing 
of Peter to pay Paul-would render the United States' financial obli-
gations meaningless."267 Finally, the court refused to scrutinize the 
possibility that the Board was taking advantage of the United States 
by including general school improvement programs in the desegrega-
tion budget. 268 In so doing, the judge recognized as legitimate any 
expenses that "materially aid 0 the success of the overall desegrega-
tion effort. "269 
The United States filed a response to the June 8 ruling.270 Basi-
cally, the United restated many of its arguments raised previously 
before the court of appeals. A central claim of its arguments was the 
fact that even if the president promised to seek special congressional 
appropriations to fund Chicago's desegregation plan, the Court 
would be powerless to enforce such an agreement against the execu-
tive.271 The United States argued that it was meeting its consent 
decree obligation, and pointed to a letter by Secretary of Education 
Bell to the Illinois Superintendent of Education which urged Illinois 
to provide more of its block grant funds to Chicago for school deseg-
regation purposes.272 The United States appealed the court's 
order.273 
D. Conclusions 
Chicago II will probably be a costly lesson to the federal govern-
ment. Yet, it should be able to avoid future Chicago II's if the DOJ 
spells out in desegregation consent decrees what funding obligations 
the government is willing to undertake. The larger question, of 
whether and to what extent the federal government should assist lo-
cal desegregation efforts, is not directly raised by the case. At the 
/d. at 139. Judge Shadur similarly noted that 
[t]o date, 11 separate letters have come in about the loss of a program that . .. 
sounds highly worthwhile. If the United States will not be candid and acknowledge 
that this baby, and all the other orphans created by the United States' intransi-
gence, must be laid at its doorstep and not that of this Court, either this Court or 
someone else ought to make that clear. 
Id. at 138 n.l. 
267 /d. at 218. 
268 Seez(/. at 220-21. 
269 /d. at 221. 
270 Stt United States' Report to the Court, June 25, 1984. 
271 /d. at 2. 
272 /d. at 5-6. 
273 Stt Brief for United States, United States v. Board of Educ., No. 84-2405 (7th Cir. 
Aug. 23, 1984). 
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same time, by forcing Congress to address the problem of the financ-
ing of local desegregation efforts, Chicago II has resulted in its reevalu-
ating the federal government's role in providing desegregation 
assistance.274 Chicago II is also a challenge to the Reagan administra-
tion to support initiatives which will result in sufficient federal ex-
penditure for effective voluntary desegregation programs. 
The basic substantive holding in Chicago II, that the government 
has an affirmative obligation to take positive steps to help fund the 
Board's plan, does not seem unreasonable. At the same time, the 
government probably did not intend to obligate itself to become fin-
ancier of Chicago's costly voluntary school desegregation plan. The 
Board, as well, probably expected the bulk of government assistance 
to come from then existing federal aid programs. ESAA, the primary 
desegregation assistance program extant when the decree was en-
tered into, provided sizable grants to urban school systems, but not 
on the order of the amount cited in the most recent opinion from 
Judge Shadur.275 It is difficult to conceive that the school board 
could have reasonably expected to receive from the Federal govern-
ment annual grants for desegregation of anywhere near $104 million. 
IV. Implications of Chicago 
A. Legislative Concern With the Block Grant and Ejforts to Revive ESAA 
The Chzcago litigation speaks to more than the pursuit of equal 
educational opportunity in that city. It suggests that if the federal 
government is committed to financing school desegregation, the cur-
rent block grant appears ineffective for the task. 
The "new federalism" in education was intended to reduce fed-
eral intervention in local school affairs. To date, its principal result is 
Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 
1981 ("ECIA") which repealed over two dozen categorical education 
programs, including the primary federal program assisting school de-
274 See note 255 supra and notes 279-95 infta. 
275 Among the largest FY 1981 ESAA awards were the approximately $7 million received 
by both Los Angeles and Milwaukee. J. Stedman, supra note 48, at 752. 
It is not within the scope of this article to analyze the soundness of these decisions. These 
decisions raise significant separation of powers issues. Initially, it is unclear whether the gov-
ernment can obligate itself either to commit funds or to seek to make funds available beyond 
the current fiscal year. It is also possible that, with the repeal of ESAA, government funding 
obligations were effectively voided. Finally, Congress may be able to alleviate the govern-
ment obligation through the passage of legislation or appropriations measures. These issues, 
as well as others, will be addressed in a forthcoming article by Jeremy Rabkin and Neal 
Devins. 
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segregation efforts. The repealed program activities were continued 
as authorized activities for block grant spending. Since school dis-
tricts have the discretion to spend their block grant funds for any 
authorized activity, the ECIA in effect treats them all as equally wor-
thy of federal support. Thus, spending for school desegregation is 
treated as no more important than spending for instructional materi-
als, or for programs in metric education or consumer education, all of 
which are approved for spending in the block grant. 276 
The block grant's current structure precludes concentrating fed-
eral funds on particular activities. Its funds are distributed among 
all local school districts in the country. In contrast, antecedent pro-
grams, including ESAA, focused on specific activities and often 
funded only a small number of districts. Chicago, as a result, appar-
ently had a net decline between FY 1981 and FY 1982 in its funding 
for activities covered by the block grant.277 The impact of this shift in 
the distribution of resources may be exacerbated because the effec-
tive use of funds for certain activities depends in part upon the 
amount of funding available.278 
Perhaps as significant as the level of assistance available is the 
reluctance of school districts to pursue equal educational opportunity 
absent outside intervention. Federal education support and the lev-
276 The Department of Education may soon learn this lesson about the current block 
grant-it provides little leverage on school districts' actions. The FY 1985 budget request for 
the Department of Education includes a $250 million increase for the Chapter 2 block grant. 
According to Secretary of Education Terrel H. Bell, this increase is intended to finance re-
form recommendations made by the National Commission on Excellence in Education. He 
stated, "[t)hese funds can be used by States and local school districts to address such needs as 
upgrading high school graduation requirements in the 'five new basics,' training teachers, 
developing experimental pay plans, and expanding school days or years." Statement ofT.H. 
Bell, Secretary of Education, on the "Fiscal Year 1985 Budget," U.S. DEP'T OF Eouc. NEws, 
Feb. I, 1984, at 3. Of course, the Department cannot require that districts in fact spend their 
Chapter 2 funds on those activities, a point already being made. In a recent article, a state 
coordinator of Chapter 2 activities in an unidentified Rocky Mountain State is quoted as 
saying, "[t)he local agencies have great discretion when it comes to spending this money. It 
will be a real challenge directing them to funnel their money into new areas, especially when 
you consider that the law specifically prohibits us from telling them what to do with their 
block grants." Mirga, Chapter 2 .Directors Qpestion Plans for Block Grants, Eouc. WEEK, Feb. 15, 
1984, at 1, 14. Another coordinator from a northwestern state is quoted as saying, "we have 
about 200 small districts in my state and one of our smallest ones received a grant of $65 last 
year •.. . What do you think they'll do with a 50-percent increase?" 
277 Comparing the antecedent funding level for FY 1981 with that for the Chapter 2 block 
grant for FY 1982. R. JuNG & T. BARTELL, supra note 73, at 11, table 3. Chicago's drop in 
funding was $426,017 (6.3% of its FY 1981 funding under the antecedent programs). But see 
notes 234-36, supra for DOJ contention that Chicago actually fared better under the block 
grant than it did under the antecedent programs. 
278 See note 276 supra; American Association of School Administrators, supra note 74, at 18. 
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erage it provided over school districts were used to remedy the dis-
tricts' lack of commitment to equal education opportunity 
demonstrated between 1954 and 1964. The ESAA pre-grant review 
procedure continued to exert pressure on districts as the price of fed-
eral aid. The lack of Chapter 2 spending by school districts on deseg-
regation-related activities appears to be in keeping with the history of 
equal educational opportunity in local educational agencies. In par-
ticular, the way in which the block grant funds are spread among 
school districts and the great local discretion over their use contrib-
ute to the program's ineffectiveness in addressing school desegrega-
tion needs. This conclusion appears to be one of the motives for 
recent congressional action to create a new desegregation assistance 
program for schools. 
Congressional interest in the effects of the education block grant 
on school desegregation grew over the past two years, resulting in 
passage by the House of a bill to revive a modified ESAA program 
and, subsequently, passage by both Houses of a program of assistance 
for desegregation-related magnet schools.279 Although undoubtedly 
it will not receive further Senate consideration due to passage of the 
magnet schools program, the House bill to re-establish an ESAA pro-
gram merits some discussion because it illustrates congressional 
thinking on the block grant and desegregation assistance. The bill 
states that local educational agencies do not have the additional re-
sources required to eliminate or prevent minority group isolation and 
to improve education for all children. 280 It notes that some school 
districts need additional funds to complete activities begun with 
ESAA funds,281 and authorizes $100 million for FY 1984 and such 
279 H.R. 2207 (Emergency School Aid Act) was passed by the House on June 7, 1983, 
under suspension of the rules. 129 GONG. REc. H3692 (daily ed. June 7, 1983). H.R. 1310 
(Education for Economic Security Act) as passed by the Senate on June 27, 1984, contains a 
title authorizing a Magnet School Assistance Program. 130 GoNG. REC. S8440 (daily ed. 
June 27, 1984). The magnet school title was added and the program approved by the Senate 
on June 6, 1984. 130 GoNG. REc. S6682 {daily ed. June 6, 1984). The House approved the 
Senate-pased version on July 25, 1984. 130 GONG. REC. H7745 (daily ed. July 25, 1984). 
280 Emergency School Aid Act, H.R. REP. 98-136 to accompany H.R. 2207, 98th Gong., 
1st Sess. 3 (1983). The report on the legislation by the House Committee on Education and 
Labor stated: 
/d. 
The need for desegregation assistance has not diminished. Desegregation of public 
schools is a national goal, requiring a national effort to achieve. The absence of 
Federal aid makes it less likely that school districts will be as able or willing to 
undertake this massive commitment. Without the crucial educational and commu-
nity activities supported by ESAA, school desegregation does not work. 
281 The committee reported that the block grant "drastically reduc[ed] desegregation-re-
lated programs in hundreds of school districts around the country." Id. at 2. 
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sums as may be necessary for the next two fiscal years. The House 
proposal modifies the previous act primarily by eliminating a state-
based allotment formula applied to a portion of ESAA funds. It 
would continue the nondiscrimination requirements and the pre-
grant review from the previous act. 282 
In dissent, four members of the Education and Labor Commit-
tee argued that the school desegregation "emergency" was over, the 
"integrity" of the block grant was at stake, the legislation was unnec-
essary since ESAA activities were already authorized under the block 
grant, and ESAA funding had been misused in the past.283 The dis-
senters questioned whether the legislation was "only a first step in the 
dismantling of the block grant, as those who did not fare as well 
under the block grant funding process seek to regain Federal 
dollars. "284 
Representative Goodling (R-Pa.), in individual views presented 
in the committee report, stated that although he was an architect of 
the current education block grant, he viewed the legislation to reen-
act ESAA as honoring a "moral commitment to extend some limited, 
special assistance, particularly to those districts caught in the middle 
of an expensive ongoing desegregation plan when ESAA was re-
pealed and placed in the block grant."285 On the House floor during 
deliberation, Representative Goodling observed that, despite ~he 
block grant's authorization of ESAA activities, "the substate formula 
decisions made at the State level have made it almost impossible for 
the districts that formerly relied heavily on ESAA grants to complete 
the programs they embarked upon. " 286 The idea that a revived 
ESAA would support voluntary desegregation efforts apparently ap-
pealed to many House members. Representative Goodling noted 
that ESAA is "a natural complement to the Uustice] Department's 
[voluntary] approach to school desegregation."287 Representative 
Conte expressed his support of the legislation "so that cities that have 
worked out voluntary, locally-developed plans, can continued their 
efforts to provide a quality education to all children."2ss 
The desegregation assistance program ultimately passed by both 
Houses of Congress had its origin in the Senate. The previously dis-
282 Su id. 
283 /d. at 22-24. 
284 /d. at 23. 
285 /d. at 20. 
286 129 CONG. REC. H3587 (daily ed. June 6, 1983). 
287 /d. 
288 /d. at H3588. 
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cussed House bill to revive ESAA encountered hostility in the Sen-
ate.289 A compromise over desegregation aid was nevertheless 
reached and adopted as an amendment to a bill to improve math 
and science education.290 The amendment authorizes $75 million a 
year for FY 1984 through FY 1986 for a Magnet Schools Assistance 
program to support the planning, establishment, and conduct of 
magnet schools that are part of an eligible desegregation plan. 291 
Some critics of a new ESAA program have argued that ways of 
targeting funds within the current education block grant short of es-
tablishing a new categorical aid program should be explored.292 For 
example, intrastate allocation formulas could be made sensitive to 
the districts' desegregation-related needs, or the legislation could 
specify some priorities. One cannot tell, of course, whether continu-
ing ESAA would have prevented the litigation in Chicago over the 
federal financial obligation to that city's desegregation plan.293 Nev-
ertheless, its repeal certainly played a pivotal role in the litigation. 
Judge Shadur apparently viewed the fact that the administration 
289 Hatch Said to Seek Compromise on Desegregation-Azd Stalemate, Eouc. WEEK, May 2, 1984, 
at 14. 
290 130 GoNG. REc. S6673-82 (daily ed. June 6, 1984) (adoption of amendment to 
S.1285); 130 GoNG. REc. S8440 (daily ed. June 27, 1984)(passage of H .R. 1310 with text of 
S.1285 as amended inserted in lieu thereof). 
291 See 130 GONG. REC. S6676 (daily ed. June 6, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Eagleton (D-Mo.) 
concerning the bill's narrow focus) . 
To be eligible for funding under the bill, a school district must have lost $1 million in 
federal funding in the first year following the repeal of ESAA, or must be implementing a 
court or state-ordered desegregation plan, or a voluntary plan complying with Title VI. A 
district must further assure that it will not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, color, or 
national origin in hiring, promoting or assigning employees, assigning students to schools or 
courses of instruction (unless part of the desegregation plan), or in conducting extracurricular 
activities. According to the remarks of one sponsor, the Department of Education must show 
intent before finding a district in violation. 130 GoNG. REC. S6681 (daily ed. June 6, 
1984)(remarks of Sen. Hatch). 
Supporters of the legislation cited numerous examples of school districts that had suf-
fered serious funding losses with the repeal of ESAA. See 130 GONG. REC. S6675-76 (remarks 
of Sen. Eagleton), S6676-77 (remarks of Sen. Bradley (D-N.J.)), S6679-81 (remarks of Sen. 
Moynihan (D-N.Y.)) (daily ed. June 6, 1984). 
292 House Report, supra note 280, at 23. 
293 The availability of ESAA funding has played a similar role in previous litigation. In 
1981, the Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court decision in litigation concerning school 
desegregation in St. Louis. One item being appealed was the lower court's failure to order 
that the U.S. had to pay for some of the costs of the desegregation of the city's schools. The 
Court of Appeals upheld the lower court, noting in part that in 1980-81 the U.S. had pro-
vided more than $7 million in ESAA funds to St. Louis, and "the evidence in the record gives 
us no reason to believe that similar funding will not be available to continue implementation 
of the plan for the forseeable future." Liddel v. Board ofEduc., 667 F.2d 643,654 (1981); see 
also Liddel v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351 (1980). 
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"sought and supported in Congress the repeal of ESAA,"294 as one 
finding showing that "the Executive Branch . . . and the Depart-
ment of Education have been engaged in a continuous effort to strip 
away all means by which they could fulfill the United States' obliga-
tion under Section 15.1."295 
Chicago may also have an effect on a new desegregation assist-
ance program. Judge Shadur has ruled that the consent decree re-
quires the United States to provide funding for five years, beginning 
with the 1983-84 school year.296 Given the events of the past year, 
and in light of the substantial amount of federal assistance Judge 
Shadur has ruled is owed Chicago, a new desegregation assistance 
program might be a likely target for another judicially-imposed 
freeze pending resolution of the litigation. 
B. Implications of the Administration-'s Education Polz()' 
Perhaps the greatest irony in this situation lies in the Reagan 
administration's position on desegregation and the "new federalism." 
On one hand, the administration clearly prefers voluntary desegrega-
tion methods to mandatory reassignment of students.297 Chicago, 
with its reliance on voluntary measures, may be something of a show-
case for demonstrating the effectiveness of that approach in an urban 
school system.298 On the other hand, the administration apparently 
is not prepared to seek the financial support required to implement a 
voluntary school desegregation plan.299 Confronted with judicial rul-
ings that it has an obligation to provide such support in Chicago, the 
administration responded by challenging them, even when it ap-
peared that Chicago was unable to finance the plan alone. Thus, it is 
not clear what is of most importance to the Reagan administration-
success of the Chicago desegregation effort, reducing federal involve-
ment in education, or resisting perceived judicial threats to the bal-
ance of power controlling federal education funding. 
For local school officials, Chicago teaches that the "new federal-
ism" may be a two-edged sword. The likelihood may now be greater 
294 567 F. Supp. at 276. 
295 /d. at 280. 
296 /d. at 287. 
297 St-e text accompanying notes 135-39 supra. 
298 St-e text accompanying notes 191-93 supra. 
299 Recent consent decrees entered into by the DOJ with the school boards of Lima, Ohio, 
and Bakersfield, California, rely exclusively on voluntary desegregation methods. Neither 
decree provides for federal financial support for the plans. See Mirga and Caldwell, U.S. 
Approves Volunta1)' Plans to Desegregate, Eouc. WEEK, Feb. 1, 1984, at 1, 15. 
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of negotiating a consent decree with the DOJ that relies on voluntary 
methods of desegregation.300 But the "new federalism" not only 
seeks to reduce federal direction of education, but also seeks to reduce 
the federal financial presence in education, with the result that little 
federal funding is being directed to school desegregation. From a 
school district's perspective, the prospect of a voluntary, negotiated 
plan may be appealing, but the burden of financing that plan will 
rest solely on the school district and the state, unless the consent de-
cree clearly obligates the federal government to provide this support. 
But it does not seem likely that the administration will agree to lan-
guage similar to Section 15.1 of the Chicago consent degree. 
Summary of Conclusions 
The federal government professes an interest in equal educa-
tional opportunity. If that interest necessitates a federal funding 
role, the present education block grant appears inadequate to pro-
vide the financial support needed to assist local efforts to desegregate 
schools. As the situation in Chicago shows, the success of voluntary 
desegregation may be affected by the "new federalism" in education. 
Addendum 
On September 2fi /9817 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit overturned the remedial order of the district court. United States 
v. Board ofEduc., slip. op. No. 81-2105., (7th Cir. Sept. 2fi /981). The 
Court of Appeals noted that since the fideral government was now (J;repared to 
give the Board prioril:)l in the distribution of desegregation fonds under existing 
fideral programs; n it had satisfied its contractual obligation to asszst llz the 
fondzng of Chicago school desegregation. Id. at 10 (emphasis added). The 
court reJected the dzstrict court:S holdzng that the admznistratzon breached the 
consent decree by engagzng zn legislative activities that ejfoctive[J reduced deseg-
regatzon fonds for the school board The court did not determzne an amount due 
to the Board, however; and remanded the case to the dzstri'ct court ()or a detemu"-
natzon of whether the Board zs recezvzng the maximum level of fondzng that zs 
available under the criteria of programs through which fonds for desegregatzon 
can be dzspersed n Id. at /3. 
300 /d. 
